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 I 
Abstract 
As Robert Dahl put it in 1971, ―a key characteristic of a democracy is the 
continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, 
considered as political equals‖. Democracy is thought to break down when 
equality diminishes. This paper explores the causal relation between an 
independent variable, income inequality, and a potential dependent variable, voter 
turnout (as a measure of democratic participation), at the local level in 13 electoral 
districts in New Zealand over 4 national elections.     
For Bühlmann, the three fundamental principles of democracy are equality, 
freedom and control.  Equality usually ranks at the top of most democratic criteria.  
New Zealand, once regarded as one of the most egalitarian societies in the world, 
was ranked 23
rd 
out of 34 countries on the OECD measure of income inequality in 
2012, and has continued to drop since then, with ―New Zealand [having] the 
largest increase in income inequality of all the OECD countries since the mid 
1980‘s…‖. Of the top 20% of income earners, 86% voted in the New Zealand 
national elections, compared to the bottom 20% of income earners, where only 75% 
voted. Goodin and Dryzek argue that the more that economic power is 
concentrated within the elite, the more the bottom income earners will withdraw 
from electoral voting.   
Participation in politics, in this interpretation, tends to be driven by 
relative income.  Income inequality, in this view, hinders democracy by blocking 
full participation in society and limiting a sense of belonging.  This study has 
tested these presumptions with a cursory longitudinal analysis of 13 comparative 
and contrasting local electoral districts in New Zealand, once the most egalitarian 
and, arguably, most democratic country in the world.  
The research shows that household income inequality has an inverse effect 
on voter turnout, taken as a whole. With the voting that has occurred, there is a 
clear preference for right-of-centre parties. Regardless of economic standing, 
citizens are apparently continuing to vote against their immediate interests. The 
results also suggest that while employment rates are currently high in New 
Zealand, voter turnout is decreasing and voters perhaps have previously blamed 
the government for their lack of employment even when they have seemingly lost 
the bases of their grievances.   
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 1 
Introduction  
 
In New Zealand and on an international level, there has been an alarming decline 
in voter turnout. Declining voter turnout poses a threat to democratic processes. 
Rather than remaining a political framework malleable to the opinions of the 
majority, democracies become overwhelmingly determined by a wealthy few, that 
is, when a few, privileged citizens ultimately determine electoral outcomes. This 
is what happens, according to the following study, when voter turnout declines 
because of overwhelming income inequality.   
Voter turnout has been surveyed by numerous scholars and political 
figures and measured against numerous variables. One variable that has seemingly 
been given little regard in existing scholarship is that of ―household income 
inequality‖ (HII). With HII on the rise and a decrease in voter turnout, there is a 
gap in knowledge regarding the potential relation between HII and election turnout 
numbers within New Zealand. The scholarship cited throughout has gone into 
depth on issues of social class, education and income as potential determinants of 
an individual‘s voting choices, or willingness to vote at all.  
As historically argued by Brady, Verba and Schlozman,
1
 as well as 
Lijphart,
2
 and Scott and Acock,
3
 I also consider social class, education and 
income as primary determinants of voting patterns and voter turnout. Applying a 
more contemporary lens, however, enables us to consider the recent changes to 
New Zealand‘s societal structure due to the rising rates of income inequality and 
the declining rates of voter turnout.  Declining voter turnout is a multi-faceted 
issue comprised of an array of variables. For this project, however, I have limited 
these variables to HII and employment rates within the New Zealand context. 
Declining rates of political participation tend to undermine the fundamental 
principle of democracy and challenge the efficacy of democracy as a viable means 
of attaining political equality and inclusion. Working within this democratic 
framework, this paper relates New Zealand‘s increasing income inequality and 
                                                          
1
 Henry Brady, Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Schlozman, ‗Beyond SES: A Resource Model of 
Political Participation‘, American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 271-294.  
2
 Arend Lijphart, ‗Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma Presidential 
Address‘, American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 1-14. 
3
 Wilbur J. Scott and Alan C. Acock, ‗Socioeconomic Status, Unemployment Experience, and 
Political Participation: A Disentangling of Main and Interaction Effects‘, Political Behavior, 1 
(1979), 361-381. 
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increasing rates of unemployment with its declining voter turnout in national 
elections from 2005-2014. 
New Zealand was once one of the most egalitarian societies in the world.
4
 
It was considered a classless society where immigrants from England found 
themselves in a largely free society and a supportive welfare state. As Robert Dahl 
suggested, equality and democracy are symbiotic, that is, if equality diminishes, 
democracy will tend to break down. Democracy should, theoretically, create or 
maintain a relatively equal political standing between citizens despite their 
respective levels of wealth and/or social status. Over the last thirty years, however, 
economic reforms and societal structures in New Zealand have created an 
imbalance between the wealthy and the less wealthy. New Zealand has been noted 
as having one of the fastest growing income gaps in the world.
5
   Twenty years 
later, the repercussions of the disparate growth between the wealthy and less 
wealthy, has reshaped society. My argument suggests that this escalating income 
inequality plays a role in subsequent political choices, and specifically in the way 
in which individuals conceptualise their role as political participants. 
From 1981 to 1996 voter turnout was over 80%. However, from 1999 to 
2011 turnout dropped, ranging between 70% to 80%.
6
 Statistics New Zealand 
completed an annual New Zealand General Social Survey which has a section 
researching non-voters. The 2014 survey asked individuals to give reasons as to 
why they did not vote in the 2008 and 2011 national elections. The most common 
reason given was that ‗I didn‘t get round to it or I forgot about it/am not 
interested‘, this reason received 20.6% of the responses in 2008, and 21.0% in 
2011. The next highest reason for not voting was ‗I didn‘t think it was worth 
voting‘. ‗Because it makes no difference which party is in government‘ received a 
response rate of 8.0% in 2008 and 7.0% in 2011. The third highest response rate 
was for: ‗I didn‘t think it was worth voting because my vote wouldn‘t have made 
a difference‘.  This reason received a response rate of 3.9% in 2008 and 7.1% in 
                                                          
4
 Leslie Lipson, The Politics of Equality; New Zealand’s Adventures in democracy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1948).  
5Fiona Imlach Gunasekara, Kristie Carter and Sarah NcKenzie, ‗Income-related Health 
Inequalities in Working Age Men and Women in Australia and New Zealand‘, ANZJPH, 37 
(2013), 211-217.  
6
 New Zealand Parliament, Final Results for the 2011 New Zealand General Election and 
Referendum, Partliamentary Library, updated 2012, < https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/research-
papers/document/00PLLaw2012021/final-results-for-the-2011-new-zealand-general-election> 
[accessed 3 February 2017] (para. 10 of 19).  
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2011.
7
 The study found several similar characteristics among non-voters: there 
were higher rates of young people who did not vote, and people with lower 
incomes were also less likely to vote. 28% of individuals who said they did not 
have enough money to meet everyday needs did not vote, while, significantly, 
only 12% of individuals who said they did have enough money did not vote. 
Unemployed people here, were less likely to vote, and recent immigrants, 
although qualified, were less likely to vote than long-term migrants.
8
  
Within this project, particular emphasis was given to the finding that those 
with inadequate incomes and those who were unemployed were the groups least 
likely to vote. Income and employment are, arguably, the primary means people 
use to achieve status within society. As I will discuss further (below), social status 
creates an imbalance within society because the comparison of wealth and/or 
privilege generated between the wealthier and the less wealthy tends to generate 
stress, and this has a detrimental effect on overall health.
9
 Income inequality 
stigmatises a society while manufacturing a sense of entitlement among the 
wealthy. The dominant influence of the wealthy within the political sphere 
ultimately leads to a plutocracy and away from a democracy. Democracy should, 
in theory at least, contribute to greater income redistribution
10
. 
Of the top 20% of income earners in New Zealand, 86% voted in national 
elections, compared with the bottom 20% of income earners, where only 75% 
voted.
11
 Voting, in this interpretation, is significantly influenced by relative 
income.
12
 It is a problematic feature of New Zealand democracy that there exists a 
substantial disparity between the more wealthy and the low-income individuals 
(or households—whatever measurement is employed). In the case of the lower 
income brackets, there appears to be a sense of exclusion or futility regarding the 
                                                          
7
 Statistics New Zealand, Non-voters in 2008 and 2011 general elections: Findings from New 
Zealand General Social Survey, Statistics New Zealand, updated 2014, < 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/people_and_communities/Well-being/civic-human-
rights/non-voters-2008-2011-gen-elections.aspx> [accessed 3 February 2017] (para 1 of 6).  
8
 Statistics New Zealand, ‗Non-voters in 2008 and 2011 general elections: Findings from New 
Zealand General Social Survey‘. 
9
 Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level (London: Penguin books, 2010) pp. 31-45. 
10
 Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James Robinson: ‗Democracy, 
Redistribution and Inequality‘ in Handbook of Income Distribution, ed. by Anthony Atkinson 
Francois Bourguignon (United States America, Elsevier B.V, 2014). 
11
 OECD, New Zealand,  Better Life Index, updated 2015, < 
http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/new-zealand/ > [accessed 19 June 2016]. 
12
 Robert Goodin and John Dryzek, ‗Rational Participation: The Power of Relative Power‘ British 
Journal of Political Science, 10 (1980), 273-292. 
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political sphere, whilst the wealthier more readily engage with it. Consequentially, 
the wealthier–or those who are statistically more likely to exercise their right to 
vote—are inevitably going to influence New Zealand politics and determine 
political outcomes, whereas the less wealthy tend to disengage.  
Wealth, it seems, or the lack of it, relates closely with how individuals 
conceptualise their roles as political participants and their engagement within this 
particular sphere. To explore the relationship between declining voter turnout and 
income inequality and unemployment, this paper examines Hll as a measure. It 
thereby seeks to evaluate whether this variable directly effects political 
participation. It should be noted here that while income inequality as a general 
variable is an important aspect of voter turnout, this work takes income inequality 
as its primary focus. 
As noted earlier, a key element in a democratic welfare state like New 
Zealand is the equal standing of its citizens. However, if we are seeing a decline 
in voter turnout, especially among the less wealthy, redistribution will, in theory, 
decrease due, at least theoretically, to the higher voter turnout, and the 
consequently more effective demands of the wealthy.  The disengagement of the 
less wealthy minimises the support for policies that benefit this demographic. 
New Zealand will consequently face the likelihood of a democracy that 
increasingly represents the values of the wealthy.  Arguably, this trend of 
disparate political participation between the wealthy and less wealthy within New 
Zealand is enabling the wealthier classes to hold greater power through political 
engagement. This is arguably undemocratic and contrary to the values of 
democracy. 
In order to establish a causal link between HII and employment with voter 
turnout and party preferences, my research employs a quantitative approach with 
the variables of HII, voter turnout, party vote preferences and employment rates. I 
use graphs in order to establish and analyse trends to examine  hypotheses. I 
explore change in13 New Zealand electoral districts in the variables listed. Nine 
of the districts are chosen at random, two, for their high average household 
incomes, and two because they are Māori electoral districts. This study focuses on 
a nine-year period with four national elections conducted in 2005, 2008, 2011 and 
2014.  
  
5 
Throughout this thesis, there is the frequent use of ‗left-of-centre‘ and 
‗right-of-centre‘ as ideological orientations in voting preferences. Depending on a 
country‘s political party structure, ‗left-of-centre‘ and ‗right-of-centre‘ refer to 
preferences regarding redistribution of incomes and resources, with ‗left-of-centre 
favouring income redistribution through progressive taxation, and ‗right-of-centre 
opposing redistributive policies. Questions of redistribution represent the most 
important criteria for purposes of this study, and are therefore the basis of the 
distinction between ‗left-of-centre‘ and ‗right-of-centre‘ in this thesis.  
The terminology used herein of ‗wealthy‘ and ‗less wealthy‘ implies that 
the ‗wealthy‘ are a group of high-income earners who do not struggle to make 
ends meet. The ‗less wealthy‘ is a group that is struggling to make ends meet, and 
typically do not see themselves as having enough money to meet every day needs. 
As discussed further in Chapter Five, for purposes of this study, the ‗wealthy‘ are 
the top 80% of income earners and the ‗less wealthy‘ are the bottom 20%. Many 
of the studies in this thesis do not define the income levels of the two groups, but 
rather consider the research on income inequality.  
‗Wealth‘ is a complicated measure. The nine districts chosen at random 
are of similar income levels, but the cost of living in each district has not been 
tabulated.   The two higher household earning districts are in Auckland (Mt Albert) 
and Wellington (Wellington Central). Auckland has recently been identified as the 
fourth most expensive city in the world, primarily because of its housing costs.
13
 
Although the Mt Albert electoral district tends to have higher incomes, it is 
difficult to affirm that this district is ‗more wealthy‘ because of its significantly 
higher cost of living. 
This thesis endeavours to highlight the importance of household income 
inequality as it relates to voter patterns, societal engagement, and its costs to the 
democratic process. Answering the question, ‗does HII affect voting blocs in New 
Zealand?‘ this study ultimately hopes to influence policy and educate its readers 
about HII and the corresponding effects on political and societal engagement. 
To answer this overall research question, I have divided the argument into 
three hypotheses:  
                                                          
13
 Alison Milllington, The 10 most expensive cities to live in, World Economic Forum, updated 
2017, < https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/02/the-10-most-expensive-cities-to-live-in > 
[accessed 8 February 2017] (para. 12 of 15). 
  
6 
Hypotheses 1: When household income inequality  rises, voter turnout in national 
elections drops. 
Hypothesis 1a: When household income inequality rises, the National Party 
receives more votes on the national level.  
Hypothesis 1b: When unemployment rises, the rate of voter turnout increases.  
A sample of thirteen electoral districts out of a possible sixty-four have been 
chosen for this study. This small sample can be said to be representative of the 
population of interest, although I am mindful that this is a limited study because 
of the small sample size. The districts were gathered via stratified random 
sampling with some shared characteristics. Districts were chosen based upon an 
apparent preponderance of low household income, high household income, or 
status as Māori voting districts. Four national elections over a nine-year period 
were examined. The limited nature of the study as a master‘s thesis did not allow 
for more districts or elections.  
Conclusion 
This chapter introduced a gap in the scholarship between HII and employment and 
their relationships to voter turnout and party vote preference. The importance of 
studying income inequality was outlined, as were the potential limitations that this 
study encountered.  Chapter two will explore the history of economic reforms 
which influenced HII and employment. It will attempt to analyse how income 
inequality evolves and, furthermore, the potential threats income inequality poses 
to the values of democracy. 
 
  
  
7 
Chapter One: Income inequality: The History and Current Standing of New 
Zealand  
 
I will analyse the current scholarship on income inequality and how it came to be 
a cultural issue and thereby disadvantage society. This chapter will attempt to 
establish that income inequality engenders negative social and political changes 
and has the potential to gradually breakdown New Zealand‘s economy and social 
reforms. In other words, the events in New Zealand‘s recent history have led to 
pejorative outcomes and a consequent outcry for political change.   
Income inequality  
 
Firstly, it is important to define what income inequality is. The definition provided 
in Max Rashbrooke‘s book, Inequality: A New Zealand Crisis, describes 
inequality as:  
the way incomes are distributed unequally across the various participants 
in an economy… this refers to differences between households, but 
occasionally it is used to describe differences in individuals‘ incomes.14  
John Rawls often wrote about the problems of inequality. In A Theory of Justice, 
Rawls found that economic inequality should be addressed so that the outcome 
leads to the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society, and this 
would necessarily entail redistribution. He also notes that offices and positions 
must be open to everyone under conditions of equal opportunity.
15
 Rawls argued 
that income equality was the key to social justice. His theory required citizens to 
not only be formally equal but substantively equal. All citizens, he argued, should 
have the same opportunities to hold office and have the ability to influence 
elections – regardless of social class. This understanding has its limitations in 
application, however. Using Thomas Hobbes famous text, Leviathan, which seeks 
to describe humanity‘s natural state, affirmed that: ―[humans have] a perpetual 
and restless desire of power after power‖.16  This suggests that, with the innate 
                                                          
14
 Max Rashbrooke, Inequality: A New Zealand Crisis (New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books, 
2013), p. 5.  
15
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (USA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 302.  
16
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: n.pub, 1651), p. 61. 
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need for power, there is the need for capitalism.
17
 This desire is the foundation of 
income inequality: regardless of restrictions, an unequal society is an inevitable 
outcome. This prevalence of income inequality extends to later writers Jane 
Austen and Honore de Balzac, who discuss the rise in income inequality in Britain 
and France in the Eighteenth Century. They share a similar view to Hobbes in that 
they see the human lust for power and greed as inevitable. This view is outlined 
graphically in William Forster Lloyd‘s early Nineteenth Century economic theory, 
the Tragedy of the Commons, where he sought to explain that within a resource-
shared society, every individual will want their share, and thus the resource will 
run dry. Ultimately, each person wants what other people have and this greed 
produces a competitive struggle to have the best or—as is the ultimate goal—to be 
the best. Inequality, as Hobbes suggests, is a feature of natural human adaptation.  
Thomas Picketty‘s Capitalism in the 21st Century surveys the causal 
relationship between wealth and income inequality. Referring to the 21
st
 century, 
Piketty describes a pattern of the wealthier growing richer. He uses a specific 
formula to explain this where the rate of return on capital (profits, dividends, 
interest, rents and other income from capital) when compared to the rate of 
economic growth is exceptionally high. He argues that when the rate of economic 
growth is low, wealth tends to accumulate faster from the return on capital, and 
this tends to accumulate more among the wealthy. This cycle is thus increasing 
inequality and creating a concentration of wealth.
18
 Moreover, this is a process by 
which newly created wealth, under some conditions, can become concentrated in 
the hands of wealthy individuals or entities: those who hold wealth have the 
means to invest in newly created sources and structures of wealth, or to otherwise 
leverage the accumulation of wealth, and therefore create more wealth.
19
 This 
unequal distribution of wealth causes social and economic instability. As Mike 
Davis illustrated in the Planet of the Slums the future will see a world housing 
crisis with deteriorating cities and most people pushed into slums as a result of the 
                                                          
17
 Crawford Brough Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to 
Locke (England: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 217. 
18
 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Translated by Arthur Goldhammer, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 124.  
19
 Piketty, p. 306. 
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current capitalism state we are in.
20
 This, as Piketty describes it, means that 
inequality is not an accident but rather a feature of capitalism.
21
 
Joseph E. Stiglitz‘s The Price of Inequality employs a similar logic to that 
of Piketty, documenting two ways in which inequality is developing: irrational 
rent-seeking behaviours and unregulated financial institutions. Rent seeking is the 
act of spending resources on political activity to increase one's share of existing 
wealth without creating wealth. The effects of rent-seeking as outlined by Stiglitz 
are reduced economic efficiency through poor allocation of resources, reduced 
wealth creation, lost government revenue, increased income inequality 
 
and, 
potentially, national economy decline.
22
 Stiglitz argues that rent-seeking 
contributes significantly to income inequality in the United States through the 
lobbying of government policies that enable the wealthy and powerful to 
accumulate income, not as a reward for creating wealth, but by grabbing a larger 
share of the wealth that would otherwise have been produced without their 
effort.
23
 Piketty affirms this point and has also analysed international economies 
and their changes in tax rates to conclude that much of income inequality is a 
result of rent-seeking among wealthy tax payers.
24
 Rent-seeking can also result in 
adverse regulation that targets certain firms, but not others (usually the rent-
seekers), thus eroding competition. Stiglitz also mentions rent-seeking in the 
market, including actions like fraud and the use of market power to extract rents,
25
 
and argues that these can aid individuals and firms in circumventing the law. 
Additionally, rent seeking is a defence mechanism that firms use to oppose 
regulation. Even if we believe that some regulation is ideal, it does not follow that 
all regulation is ideal, he notes, lending to some rent-seeking behaviour a sense of 
legitimacy. Thus, while rent-seeking may be used as a means of distorting markets 
—and it often is —it also can be used as a way of protecting markets from the 
predation of the state. Either way you look at it, the problem lies with the elite 
influencing the government to use its power to enforce rules which otherwise 
would not be developed through private institutions. 
                                                          
20
 Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (Untied States of America: Verso, 2006). 
21
 Piketty, p. 512. 
22
 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality How today’s divided Society endangers our Future 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2012) p. 36.  
23
 Stiglitz, p. 37.  
24
 Stiglitz, p. 37. 
25
 Stiglitz, p. 28-29. 
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―Inadequate financial institutions‖ refers to the banking system and its role 
in assisting the creation of levels of inequality that, without it, would not exist. 
The financial sector is in desperate need of greater competition. Competition 
would allow for the lowing of prices and less of a dictatorship between a few 
companies. Stiglitz argues that financial liberalisation during the 1970‘s and 80‘s 
created significant financial instability: financial institutions were given excessive 
and non-competitive leverage.
26
 Credit is seen as being the biggest problem. This 
is not credit in the sense that someone has been given credit, and can use it to gain 
something in return (as when someone buys a car); it is rather a convention that 
contributes to excessive bank note printing. Bank notes are a form of debt. For 
example, those who bought a house in the US during the 1990‘s and acquired debt 
were vulnerable when housing prices later collapsed. The creditors gained from 
the inflated prices, and even when the purchaser had the burden of a large debt, 
one that was worth significantly less than it once  was. Stiglitz places the blame 
for inequality stemming from this credit crisis on the current US bankruptcy 
law.
27
  When this sudden debt situation happens to large corporate firms, they are 
given leniency. However, when it comes to a private mortgage owner, this debt 
holder is not afforded the same luxury. Stiglitz recognises that with capitalism, 
current laws and corporations are key players in the creation of income inequality.  
Their function in society has continually contributed to income inequality.  
The Spirit Level, by Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, compares 23 
developed countries against each other in relation to income inequality and public 
health outcomes.  The text affirms that income inequality is detrimental to a 
society‘s health, and gives us a thorough insight into the connections between 
social and health problems in countries with high-income inequality. The overall 
finding was that income inequality, in every case, leads to wide-scale stress.
28
  
Stress is known for its serious and detrimental effects to health. The 
effects of stress are both physical and psychological, the latter including declining 
mental health, and obesity throughout society.
29
  Michael Marmot‘s 1978 UK-
based study found that heart attacks increased significantly among those lower on 
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the income ladder. He found that it is more stressful to be without an income than 
to be working in a high paying, stressful job.
30
 As we have seen in The Spirit 
Level, New Zealand figured poorly compared to the countries studied, ranking 
seventeenth out of twenty-one countries.
31
 Perhaps the most striking conclusion to 
come from The Spirit Level is that resultant social and health effects are not only 
suffered by the less wealthy. For example, Americans on average will die four and 
a half years earlier than Japanese, and this occurs without class affiliation. George 
Papandreou noted that:
 32
  
 
in all studies we have seen that more equal societies perform better in all 
categories: Life expectancy, math and literacy rates, infant morality rates, 
teenage birth rates, obesity rates & even happiness levels. Even the rich 
live longer in equal societies, so we‘re not punishing them, they benefit. 
Unrelated to an individual‘s specific class, the benefits, notably health, of an equal 
society outweigh the benefits accrued by a society with a hierarchical system. 
Wilkinson and Pickett also found income inequality serves to break down 
social cohesion: if people are seen to be equal, they feel like they have more in 
common with each other, and tend to be more trusting.
33
 Inequality creates gaps 
that weakens society and encourages competition rather than collaboration. This 
can be linked with Robert Putnam‘s research as expressed in his book Bowling 
Alone. He argues that the decline in social capital, that is, participation in joint 
activities and community-building initiatives, is weakening democracy and the 
health of societies.
34
 This is a clear example of social cohesion breaking down. As 
inequality grows, interests separate and trust levels fall, this, in turn results in 
fewer community groups, less support for the weak in society.  
A survey completed in New Zealand for the study titled The Widening 
Gap: Perceptions of Poverty and Income Inequalities and Implications for Health 
and Social Outcomes, collected data from 9 December 2004 to 24 March 2005 
and found that 43% of respondents considered government assistance essential for 
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people who were poor,
35
 and 80% believed this to be the government‘s central 
problem.
36
  An article by Paul Barber, How to get Closer Together – Impacts on 
Income Inequality and Policy Responses, showed New Zealand‘s rankings 
compared to a number of countries in the study completed in The Spirit Level.  
High inequality has vast effects on poverty in New Zealand.  We rank particularly 
high in levels of imprisonment, teenage births, infant mortality and mental 
illness.
37
  Linking this information to the graph provided above shows us that the 
higher income inequality is, the higher the social and health problems are in that 
given society. If New Zealand were to be ranked among the most equal countries, 
the results would likely be drastically different.  If other OECD countries are any 
indication, New Zealand would have only half of the current inmates in prison, 
life expectancy would increase by one to three years, there would be 2500 fewer 
teenage pregnancies and many more reductions in undesirable data as well.
38
  
Improvement in one social variable alone, education, would likely make a major 
difference.  Rashbrook argues that early childhood education could save New 
Zealand $3-$17 per child because well educated children are less likely to incur 
health, crime and other costs as they get older.
39
 
On the other hand, there has been research conducted to the contrary that 
found income inequality did not significantly affect adult mortality, including a 
2003 research report entitled ‗No association of income inequality with adult 
mortality within New Zealand: a multi-level study of 1.4 million 25-64 year 
olds‘.40  
Charles Boix, a political theorist, predicts in his text Democracy and 
Redistribution that if the political capacity of the less wealthy rises, then the 
likelihood of revolution and civil war escalates. If the less wealthy subsequently 
win such a struggle, there is a high likelihood that they will establish a left-wing 
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dictatorship.
41
 As James Madison discussed in his 1787 editorial, The Federalist 
No. 10, The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and 
Insurrection (continued), factions were thought to threaten the Republic.  He 
clarified the term faction as: 
A number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the 
whole, who are united and actuated by the same common impulse of 
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
42
  
Factions were regarded by Madison as groups that were created by income 
inequality. ―The most common and durable source of factions has been the 
various and unequal distribution of property.‖43  
Madison argued that there were two methods of preventing politics based 
on factions, the first of which was removing their causes. This is relevant to 
income inequality because, if incomes were more equal, the threat of hostile 
factions based on income inequality would, tautologically, be removed. Another 
way to fix the problem, he suggests, is to give each citizen the same opinions, the 
same passions and the same interests. Again this study presents strategies for 
equalising income in New Zealand but may prove difficult to implement.  Income 
inequality has the ability to head in two directions: the creation of fractions of the 
less wealthy, or an oligarchy created by the wealthy. Income inequality is without 
a doubt, changing society, and faction are likely in our future.  
Resolving the issues of income inequality is nevertheless widely thought 
to be one of the key requisites for the progress of a democratic government.
44
 
Living standards are the most important requirements of such a change and these 
would be enhanced if everyone in society had the opportunity to participate with 
others in the community.
45
 This, in turn, implies enhanced democratic 
participation.  Bühlmann lists the three fundamental principles of democracy as 
equality, freedom and control.  Equality and democracy go hand in hand, however. 
And therefore, in order to have a healthy and successful democracy, the income 
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gaps between classes would seem to require addressing, to create a more equal 
‗playing field‘. As it stands, however, this gap only promises to widen. The 
direction in which New Zealand is currently heading is widening the gap. Piketty 
offers a possible answer: he argues that there must be a global system 
of regressive wealth taxes. This means taxing the assets wealthy people rather 
than incomes. This would include everything from land and houses to patents to 
art and yachts. He proposes that a progressive annual global wealth tax of up to 2% 
and a progressive income tax reaching as high as 80% would help to reduce 
inequality and avoid the vast majority coming under the control of a minority or, 
to look into the near future, avoid the threat of oligarchy. The government needs 
to correct the current capitalist market, he argues, and to promote the general 
scholarship on inequality. Piketty thus concludes that unless capitalism is 
reformed, the democratic order for which we strive will be threatened.  
Democracy, in a sense, is thought to encourage the ―equalising effect‖. 
The economic structure of society is encouraged by using strategies of income 
redistribution. Welfare states can allow for a ‗pro-poor policy‘, which can be 
based on and associated with redistribution.
46
 Redistribution, it is argued, is the 
key to income equality. The bulk of wealth can only be spread across the country 
evenly with some form of redistribution. Revisiting the survey mentioned above, 
‗The Widening Gap: Perceptions of Poverty and Income Inequalities and 
Implications for Health and Social Outcomes‘ it was found that there has been a 
willingness among New Zealanders to pay higher taxes in the interests of 
maintaining some degree of equality. 82% of respondents said that they would 
pay higher taxes for better health services, 75% for a higher standard of care for 
the elderly, and 75% said yes to higher standards for those with disabilities.
47
 
Within this survey, 55% of participants believed that there should be greater 
income equality.
48
 Ben W. Ansell and David J. Samuels put this into perspective, 
noting that  
the median voter under majority rule earn less than average income. 
Because everyone with below average income should want to raise 
taxes on everyone with above-average income, democracy should 
always produce pressure for redistribution - and such pressure should 
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increase with inequality, because as the rich get richer the poorer 
median voter would gain more by continuing to raise taxes.
49
 
The willingness of New Zealand citizens to pay higher taxes in order to achieve a 
higher standard of living suggests a desire for redistribution. The participants in 
the survey apparently do not identify themselves with the wealthy, or, at least, feel 
comfortable in supporting higher taxes.  
Meltzer and Richard‘s seminal paper, A Rational Theory of the Size of 
Government? emphasised the point that the more democratic a society is, the 
more redistribution there should be.
50
 As Aristotle argued, ―in democracy the poor 
will have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will 
of the majority is supreme.‖51 An alternative view, in contemporary societies, is 
that the wealthy hold greater power because of their capacity to influence politics, 
and, thus redistribution is ultimately dependent on the wealthy in contemporary 
democracies. As long as the wealthy push for policies that do not encourage 
redistribution, democratic systems will remain under the control of the wealthy. 
Although there are greater numbers of less wealthy than wealthy people, this 
majority lacks power, and hence control and influence over policies. Frankly put, 
the less wealthy have very little weight in modern day democracies, and therefore 
structural inequality necessarily gains momentum and has the potential to increase 
socio-political instability. This in turn increasingly leads to political pressure for 
income redistribution, and generates support for populist policies, or at least 
policies that promise sweeping, if often impossible, solutions. 
Given this understanding of redistribution as a key factor, is an important 
to note the personal and lower scale implications that redistribution can have on 
society—and particularly those less than wealthy. Myths circulate in most 
societies, and certainly in New Zealand, regarding the nature of wealth, and the 
means by which individuals acquire it. One of these is that the wealthy have 
earned their way to the top. Thomas Piketty argues that this is generally not the 
case: individual wealth typically and generally depends upon parental income. 
Pikkety gives the example of a student who cannot get a job versus the student 
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with wealthy parents who can afford for their child to attend graduate school. 
Since 1980, the top 1% of the highest earners in the USA received 20% of all the 
wealth.  More specifically, in 2009-2010, the top 1% of US income earners had 93% 
of income growth. This trend, where wealth is concentrating rapidly, is by no 
means limited to the United States.  In January, 2017, Oxfam released data 
demonstrating that the eight wealthiest individuals in the world now control the 
same resources as the poorest half of the world‘s population (3.6 billion), down 
from 9 wealthiest individuals last year, that is less than one percent of the world‘s 
population now have the same resources as the other 99 percent, and that one in 
ten people in the world survive on less than US$2 per day. Furthermore, the two 
wealthiest New Zealanders, according to the same Oxfam report, have the same 
resources as the bottom 20 percent.
52
 It is clear that the wealthy can accumulate 
wealth quickly without restraints, and that this process is increasingly unrestrained.    
Stiglitz‘ The Price of Inequality discusses the ―trickledown economics‖ 
myth that was originally introduced by Ronald Reagan. He suggests that if 
redistribution was actually working without the aid of government regulation, we 
would not be seeing this unprecedented rise in income inequality.
53
 As Stiglitz 
noted in a recent address in Columbia, most Americans, indeed, most people in 
the world, are worse off than they were a decade and a half ago.   
Given the origin of the trickledown myth in the United States, it is not 
surprising that trickledown economics has hit the headlines in a country that has 
identified closely with, and struggled against, trends in US politics over the past 
four decades, New Zealand. As evident in the 2011 New Zealand elections, the 
Labour Party created a video entitled ‗Trickledown economics: the rich pissing on 
the poor‘. However, it is interesting that the lower economic classes do not appear 
to be voting in favour of higher redistribution in New Zealand, a pattern that is 
counterintuitive, and certainly contrary to the immediate needs of these voters. 
Why is this the case? Ansell and Samuels have similarly queried this unexpected 
pattern in other systems, and provided the following suggestions: 
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o  the market system is fair and the wealthy should be respected, not 
envied;  
o  structural constraints either do not exist or do not shape one‘s life 
chances;  
o  people generally get what they deserve in life and shouldn‘t ask 
for a handout;  
o  expropriating the rich might have unintended and undesirable 
consequences; or  
o  even though they are less wealthy in the present, they might be 
wealthy in the future.
54
  
The Meltzer-Richard model, which argues that the more democratic a society is 
the more redistribution will be demanded, appears to disagree with the above 
rationale. In particular, Ansell and Samuel‘s model suggests that democracy 
develops because of high-income inequality, and that redistribution may follow 
but is not necessary, or at least not in large amounts, and may not even be a 
priority for the majority. The above list explains why it is that the less wealthy 
may not expect or even want higher levels of redistribution. This logic seems odd: 
one would think that the struggles emanating from poverty would motivate those 
individuals to do whatever they could to gain a higher income. It is a lack of 
resources paired with a lack of political participation that obstructs change.
 Without a current call for redistribution by the majority, democracy 
advantageously positions the wealthy. George Papandreou expresses this same 
view, noting that ―We have created an uber class, a super-class, that is beyond 
democratic control of our nations.‖55 Susan St John acknowledges the situation 
New Zealand faces, as noted by her comment: 
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Unless we are happy to wait for the inevitable revolution, New 
Zealand needs to stop looking to American solutions of expanding 
private charity to solve inequality. What is needed are deliberately 
generous, redistributive programmes in income, housing, health and 
education.
 56
  
 
Substantial changes, as noted above, need to be made.  In this sense democracy is 
a flawed form of government.  The wealthy are rewarded, and the less wealthy are 
disillusioned, believing their own political advantage is exclusively through 
democratic means. In order for redistribution to occur, the government must 
intervene.  Instead of focusing on wealth and the ‗trickle down effect‘, everyone 
must have the ability to swim with the economic tides.
57
 If redistribution were a 
viable democratic method, income inequality would not be as prolific as it 
currently is.  In order for New Zealand to have successful redistribution, personal 
income, principally wages and capital income, must be taxed along with 
government benefits. For personal income taxes, New Zealand currently has rates 
of 33% taxed from $70,000, 30% from $48,001 to $70,000, 17.5% from $14,001 
to $48,000 and 10.5% from $0 to $14,000. With company tax at a maximum of 
28%.
58
 
Nevertheless, New Zealand retains significant vestiges of a welfare state, 
and as such, has many economic benefits in place for social needs. OECD 
economist Federico Cingano argued that ―redistribution polities via taxes and 
transfers are a key tool to ensure the benefits of growth are more broadly 
distributed.‖59 As mentioned in the survey, many New Zealanders are in favour of 
a more equal state; however the raising of taxes evokes a very negative response 
from the public. A year ago, the Labour party proposed a higher tax bracket for 
those earning $150,000 and above to 36%. An opinion poll showed that 60.3% of 
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the public were opposed.
60
 Although this was an unscientific poll, it probably 
reflected a wider view that money will move offshore if income taxes are 
increased.
61
 Action apparently should be taken, but it is a very difficult balancing 
act between social groups in order to please both the wealthy and the less wealthy.  
It is evident that the wealthy are more likely to have direct contact with 
public officials, and more likely to contribute time and money to political 
campaigns. This contributes to the inevitability that democracy evolves into 
plutocracy.  A plutocracy gradually evolves from a democracy as the wealthy use 
their resources to influence politics, examples include, political campaign 
donations, media advertising, etc. Chrystia Freeland‘s book, Plutocrats: The Rise 
of the New Global Super-Rich and the Fall of Everyone Else, observes that the 
trend towards plutocracy occurs because the wealthy feel that all their interests are 
shared by society, and do not see the difference between their views and those of 
the poor.
62
 Stiglitz‘ Vanity Fair article, entitled ‗Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 
1%‘, explains that the USA is ruled by the 1% of the wealthiest individuals. The 
USA is considered the leader in this area, and it is a kind of leadership, given 
recent political events, that most of us would argue should be avoided. As Thomas 
Piketty discusses in Capital in the Twenty-First Century, ―the risk of a drift 
towards oligarchy is real and gives little reason to be optimistic about where the 
United States is headed‖.63 This is because we are seeing a trend where mostly the 
wealthy are voting, and this trend is influencing democracy, allowing the wealthy 
to hold a majority of the power, which is invariably undemocratic and contrary to 
the values of equality. The significant weight in favour of the wealthy within a 
democratic framework puts democracy at risk of developing into an oligarchy. 
The above studies serve to illustrate that income inequality is indeed 
problematic, not just at a national level, but the international level as well. 
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Government intervention in the form of a substantial tax on the wealthy is 
required if we hope to remedy the problem of income inequality. Drawing on a 
range of scholarship, the following section surveys New Zealand‘s political 
legacy leading up to its current climate as it regards income inequality. It 
discusses social changes that have been peculiar to New Zealand, and where the 
country currently sits on the income inequality ladder. These studies are supported 
by New Zealand‘s current statistics and recent social effects as reported in the 
media.  
A Brief History of New Zealand 
 
New Zealand‘s historic political/social development is, in many respects, unique.  
New Zealand was able to make strong claims to being a classless society, at least 
up until the 1970‘s. The seminal work in this regard is Leslie Lipson‘s The 
Politics of Equality; New Zealand’s Adventures in Democracy. Kevin Sinclair, a 
New Zealand historical writer, describes New Zealand‘s classless society in his 
book, A History of New Zealand, observing that ―[New Zealand] must be more 
nearly classless… than any advanced society in the world‖.64 The reason for this 
was that wealth was only allowed to be accumulated on a relatively small scale. 
English immigrants had arrived in this ‗new country‘ without large disparities 
between them: they were of similar working class backgrounds with similar 
economic standing, and the transition to farming that many of them experienced 
did not change their status significantly.  Class was no longer a significant 
variable in their lives, or, if it was, only served to threaten their new found 
freedom.     
New Zealanders had access to a wide range of foods, notably meat, could 
own their own homes, and had ‗spare‘ money. As Daniel Ziblatt argued, using 
Boix‘s argument in Does Landholding Inequality Block Democratization? A test 
of the ‘Bread and Democracy Thesis and the case of Prussia’, the more small 
scale existing farms dominate the economic foundation of a society, the more 
likely democracy is to work:   
the percentage of total landholdings constituted by ―family farms‖ (a 
proxy for rural inequality) shapes the likelihood of democratic transition: 
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if a greater share of a nation‘s agricultural land is owned as small family 
farms, democratic transitions are more likely.
65
 
 Ziblatt also noted in this text that ―democracy proceeded unfettered where small- 
and medium-scale agriculture was dominant‖.66 New Zealand at this point was 
exactly that: a country where farming occurred on a small family scale and this in 
turn created an income structure that was relatively equal. Statistics from the 
1970s illustrate this point:  In 1976 unemployment was below 1%;
67
 from 1972-
1983 employment income held over 59% of the total household income.
68
 Lack of 
education also had a strong influence over society particularly in 1971 where 69% 
adults over the age of 15 having no educational qualifications.
69
 With a majority 
of individuals not having an education, the skill level was relatively equal, which 
arguably led to equal jobs and equal pay.   
Unions were established for workers, and the welfare state emerged which 
further strengthened equality. As William Ball Sutch noted in 1966: 
 
Living standards rose in the post-war years through a combination of good 
prices for exports, borrowing abroad, and the much greater use of internal 
resources made possible by full production. And as the New Zealand wage 
structure, taxation system, social security benefits and family farmers 
combined to make the basic family income fairly high, a higher proportion 
of people in New Zealand shared the increased amount of goods and 
services than would have been the case in any other country. This is why 
most New Zealand families have good housing and extensive durable 
goods, including a motor-car.
70
 
 
New Zealanders were living a comfortable life style. However, this started to 
change as economic dynamics shifted.  In 1973, Britain had gained full 
membership into the European Economic Community, and as a consequence of 
this, New Zealand‘s exports to Britain dropped from 65% to 26.8% within a short 
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time.
71
 With the dairy and meat industry losing its primary export market, the 
existing economy collapsed.   
During the 1980s, economic reforms became necessary. The fourth Labour 
government was elected in 1984, and Roger Douglas was elected as the Minister 
of Finance from 1984-1988. He somewhat unexpectedly enacted a series of neo-
liberal reforms, privatisations and dismantling of much of the welfare state, that 
came to be known Rogernomics, and involved such significant economic changes 
as: 
making the Reserve Bank independent of political decisions; performance 
contracts for senior civil servants; public sector finance reform based on 
accrual accounting; tax neutrality; subsidy-free agriculture; and industry-
neutral competition regulation. The exchange rate was floated; and 
controls on interest rates, wages, and prices were removed; and personal 
rates of taxation were reduced.
72
  
The repercussions from these reforms weakened the unions, increased the prices 
of state housing,
73
 lowered the personal rates of taxation for the top income group 
from 66% to 33%, and significantly cut benefits by 1991. The introduction of 
taxation of goods and services (the GST), set initially at 10%, had detrimental 
effects on the poor.
74
 With a weaker labour market, unemployment became a 
problem between1988 to 1993,
75
 and during this period the unemployment rates 
rose from 3.6% to 11%.
76
 With cuts in benefits and a sudden growth in 
unemployment, the gap between the wealthy and the less wealthy increased 
dramatically.
77
 From the late 1990‘s, the bottom quintile lagged significantly, 
there was no entitlement to the working-for-families tax credit, and many 
beneficiaries were unable to take advantage of any of the limited employment 
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opportunities.
78
  A further disparity between beneficiaries and workers developed 
as wages rose, but not at the level that the employed members of society were 
experiencing.  
New Zealand‘s economy was struggling and this inevitably effected the 
standard of living. With the standard of living declining, social issues began to 
rise. The youth suicide rates rose to the highest level in the developed world, and 
the number of New Zealander‘s estimated to be living in poverty grew by at least 
35% between 1989 and 1992. During the same time, the average economy for 
OECD nations grew by 28.2%. The economy of New Zealand grew by only 
4.7%.
79
 The standard of living in New Zealand, which in 1953 had been the third 
highest in the world, had dropped to 22
nd
 place by 1978.
80
 Graph 1 explains 
demonstrates that income inequality grew rapidly for New Zealand after the 
1970‘s, while it tended to level off in other OECD countries.81 It was in the 
1980‘s that New Zealand started to see a societal change and an extreme one at 
that. 
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Figure 1: Growth in New Zealand Income Inequality, Relative to other 
Countries, 1970s – 1990s. Equivalent Disposable Household Income 
 
Source: Des O‘Dea, ‗The changes in New Zealand‘s Income Distribution‘ (working paper, New Zealand Treasury, 2013), 
<http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/wp/2000/00-13 > [accessed 6 February 2017] p. 26. Reprinted 
with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #4. 
 
It has been argued that under Labour, ―the elective dictatorship was used to pursue 
the economic policies favoured by the wealthy and influential…rather than the 
average voter.‖82 The effects of these economic changes are seen in the inequality 
income measurement of the Gini Index. New Zealand was likely to be about 20
th
 
out of 34 countries during the mid-1980‘s, twenty-five years later it was 9th.83  
The voting system in place was First Past the Post (FPP) from 1914 to 
1993. The elections under this form of voting are decided by the number of 
electorates each party wins during the election. Such an election is not judged on 
the total number of votes received across the country. Competitiveness in an FPP 
voting system is limited to the larger parties. FPP has been used for decades by 
other larger countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, India and 
Canada. New Zealand‘s historical voting system, FPP, was working satisfactorily 
until the decline of voter turnout as a result of income inequality began.  This 
chapter explores a principle which is fundamental to all later claims: income 
inequality has significant and lasting effects on democracy.  
With income rates dropping dramatically and the struggle to make ends 
meet within this new economic context, New Zealander‘s were looking for a 
change. It was believed that the ‗Rogernomics revolution‘—which began under 
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Labour and was continued by National—was only possible because of an ‗elective 
dictatorship‘ that FPP provided.84  As strongly worded by Mulgan in 1992: 
 
 the radical reforms of the last eight years were made by politicians who 
had little or no mandate for them and rammed them through the system 
with all the resources of the elective dictatorship.
85
  
Under this framework, politicians had the power to change policies despite the 
widespread dissatisfaction of the general electorate.
86
 Citizens‘ confidence in New 
Zealand‘s political voting system was challenged. This was seen in the rapid 
change in attitudes towards FPP. The nation was in a period of extreme struggle, 
and this produced disillusionment and disengagement in voters. This 
disengagement led to a period of low voter turnout. This in turn led to questions 
regarding the functionality of FFP.  In 1979, 54% of people favoured the FPP 
system; by 1982 this number had dropped to 40%.
87
 With the economic and social 
changes, it is understandable that the citizens of New Zealand had experienced 
growing political frustration. Background historical data bear this out.  Of the 
previous seven elections before 1993, at least four of them were ‗landslides‘, 
arguably expressing a degree of instability and doubt as to the validity of FPP.
88
  
A failing economy appears to have been behind this apparent breakdown in public 
trust and confidence.
89
 The declining trust in government is said to be the product 
of declining economic performance, declining social cohesion, government 
inefficiency, and growing cynicism.
90
  
The Royal Commission recommended in 1986 that the voting system be 
changed, writing in its report that: 
 
 [the New Zealand] Constitution places almost no limits on the powers of 
governments to carry out their large responsibilities. Parliament has 
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supreme law-making powers…there are no general legal restrictions, such 
as might be found in a Bill of Rights.
91
  
 
As noted by Sir Geoffrey Palmer, ―the only factors which will force change will 
be pressure of public opinion.‖92 There was the call for a referendum which took 
place in 1992; the first referendum asked ‗Should New Zealand keep the First Past 
the Post (FFP) voting? Over 84.7% voted to change to another voting system.
93
 
The second referendum asked ‗if New Zealand were to change to another voting 
system, which voting system would you chose?‘ Voters were asked to support one 
of four options: mixed member proportional representation (MMP), the single 
transferable vote (STV), supplementary member (SM), or preferential vote (PV), 
70.5% favoured MMP.
94
 
This brief overview of political developments attempts to underscore that, 
during the 1970‘s to 1980‘s, New Zealand went through significant changes to 
income levels, and that these changes caused instability throughout the country. 
Citizens were apparently dissatisfied with changes in the standard of living, and as 
a result, searched for change. The voting system proved to be the forum in which 
this change was realised. The change from FPP to MMP is an important element 
of HII in New Zealand, as is employment. From the studies mentioned above, the 
economic reforms and the effects this had on New Zealand‘s lower economic 
classes ultimately determined the rate and form of change in the voting system. 
New Zealand‘s history displays a strong link between income inequality, 
employment and voting patterns. These patterns in New Zealand history are 
indications that income inequality is likely to have a negative effect on democratic 
political practices.  
 
New Zealand’s Current Standing  
 
New Zealand‘s income inequality has been steadily increasing. From the 1980s it 
was estimated that New Zealand was likely to be 20
th
 out of 34 countries in 
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economic inequality. 25 years later New Zealand is at number 9 out of the 34 
countries.
95
 The data produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) offers an insight into New Zealand‘s level of income 
inequality on a global scale. OECD for income inequality is measured from 0-, 
equal society, to 100, inequality. In 2012, New Zealand ranked at 33, with the 
overall average sitting at 31. New Zealand has had ―the largest increase in income 
inequality of all the OECD countries since the mid-1980‘s whereas Australia‘s 
income inequality appears to be reduced slightly over the last decade‖.96 Figure 2 
below illustrates the continued growth of income inequality in New Zealand from 
1988 to 2014.  
Figure 2: Income inequality in New Zealand: the P80:P20 ratio, 1982 to 2015, 
total population 
 
 
Note: BHC – before household costs, AHC – after household costs. 
Source: Bryan Perry, Ministry of Social Development, Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indictors of 
inequality and hardship 1982-2015 (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2015) < http://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-
and-our-work/publications-resources/monitoring/household-incomes/index.html> [accessed 6 February 2017] (pp. 32-33), 
p. 77.  Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #6. 
 
Income Inequality in New Zealand is clarified in Inequality: A New Zealand 
Crisis, by Max Rashbrooke, which outlines the seriousness of this issue. Income 
inequality in New Zealand harms the health of our society, undermining the 
foundational principle that every human being is equal. Income inequality stops 
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―people‘s ability to participate fully in their society and enjoy a sense of 
belonging‖.97 Income inequality, moreover, is intensifying.  In January, 2017, 
Oxfam International reported that the two wealthiest New Zealanders had the 
same wealth as the bottom 30 percent of the New Zealand population.
98
  If we 
look closer at New Zealand‘s income ranges, we see that in the top 20% of earners, 
84% of that group voted. Among the bottom 20% of wage earners, only 77% 
voted.
99
 Differential political participation is thought to be undemocratic; it does 
not wholly encapsulate the voices of all citizens. As Robert Dahl put it in 1971 ―a 
key characteristic of a democracy is the continued responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals‖.100 
The following tables indicate where a family sits as regards a society 
depending on their income and the makeup of their household. Using the annual 
unequivalised disposable income levels Before Housing Costs (BHC) of different 
household types.
101
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Table 1: Where does your household fit in the Overall Household Income 
Distribution (BHC)? 
Equivalised 
income decile 
Ordinary dollars (i.e., not equivalised) 
One person, 
no children 
(reference HH) 
Sole parent, 
one child 
Sole parent, 
two children 
Sole parent, 
three 
children 
Sole parent,     
four children 
Bottom 
decile 
< $17,400 < $24,400 < $30,500 < $35,900 < $40,600 
Decile 2 
17,400 - 
20,900 
24,400 - 
29,300 
30,500 - 
36,600 
35,900 - 
43,100 
40,600 - 48,700 
Decile 3 
20,900 - 
25,500 
29,300 - 
35,700 
36,600 - 
44,600 
43,100 - 
52,500 
48,700 - 59,400 
Decile 4 
25,500 - 
29,400 
35,700 - 
41,200 
44,600 - 
51,500 
52,500 - 
60,600 
59,400 - 68,600 
Decile 5 
29,400 - 
33,500 
41,200 - 
46,900 
51,500 - 
58,600 
60,600 - 
69,000 
68,600 - 78,000 
Decile 6 
33,500 - 
40,800 
46,900 - 
57,100 
58,600 - 
71,400 
69,000 - 
84,100 
78,000 - 95,100 
Decile 7 
40,800 - 
47,700 
57,100 - 
66,700 
71,400 - 
83,400 
84,100 - 
98,200 
95,100 – 
111,100 
Decile 8 
47,700 - 
54,900 
66,700 - 
76,900 
83,400 - 
96,100 
98,200 - 
113,100 
111,100 - 
127,900 
Decile 9 
54,900 - 
70,100 
76,900- 
98,100 
96,100 - 
122,600 
113,100 - 
144,300 
127,900 – 
163,300 
Top decile > $70,100 > $98,100 > $122,600 > $144,300 > $163,300 
Source: Bryan Perry, Ministry of Social Development, Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indictors of 
inequality and hardship 1982-2014 (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2015) <https://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-
and-our-work/publications-resources/monitoring/household-incomes/1982-to-2014.html> [accessed 6 February 2017] (pp. 
32-33), p. 32.  Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #6. 
  
30 
 
Table 2: Where does your household fit in the Overall Household Income 
Distribution (BHC)? 
Note: use disposable household income when using this table – that is, household income from all sources after paying 
personal income tax and after receiving all tax credits (from Working for Families) and other state transfers (eg., New 
Zealand’s, AS, main benefits) 
Source: Bryan Perry, Ministry of Social Development, Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indictors of 
inequality and hardship 1982-2014 (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2015) <https://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-
and-our-work/publications-resources/monitoring/household-incomes/1982-to-2014.html> [accessed 6 February 2017] (pp. 
32-33), p. 33.  Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #6. 
 
Equivalised 
income 
decile 
Ordinary dollars (I,e., not equivalised) 
Couple or 2 
adults 
sharing 
Couple, 
 one 
child 
Couple, 
 two 
children 
Couple, 
 three 
children 
Couple, four 
children 
Three 
adults,   
one child 
Bottom 
decile 
< 
$26,800  
< 
$32,400 
< $37,800 <$ 42,300 < $46,900 
< 
$39,400 
Decile 2 
26,800 - 
32,200 
32,400 - 
38,900 
37,800 - 
45,400 
42,300 - 
50,800 
46,900 - 
56,200 
39,400 - 
47,300 
Decile 3 
32,200 - 
39,200 
38,900 - 
47,400 
45,400 - 
55,300 
50,800 - 
61,900 
56,200 - 
68,600 
47,300 - 
57,600 
Decile 4 
39,200 - 
45,300 
47,400 - 
54,700 
55,300 - 
63,900 
61,900 - 
71,500 
68,600 - 
79,200 
57,600 - 
66,500 
Decile 5 
45,300 - 
51,600 
54,700 - 
62,300 
63,900 - 
72,700 
71,500 - 
81,400 
79,200 - 
90,100 
66,500 - 
75,700 
Decile 6 
51,600 - 
62,900 
62,300 - 
75,900 
72,700 - 
88,600 
81,400 - 
99,200 
90,100 - 
109,800 
75,700 - 
92,200 
Decile 7 
62,900 - 
73,400 
75,900 - 
88,700 
88,600 - 
103,400 
99,200 - 
115,800 
109,800 - 
128,200 
92,200 - 
107,700 
Decile 8 
73,400 - 
84,600 
88,700 - 
102,100 
103,400 - 
119,100 
115,800 - 
133,400 
128,200 - 
147,700 
107,700 - 
124,100 
Decile 9 
84,600 - 
107,900 
102,100 
- 
130,300 
119,100 - 
152,100 
133,400 - 
170,300 
147,700 
- 
188,500 
124,100 
- 
158,400 
Top decile 
> 
$107,900 
> 
$130,300 
> $152,100 > $170,300 > $188,500 
> 
$158,400 
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Taking this information further, when the population is ranked based on 
household income, the Social Report divides the incomes into five groups, each 
group comprising 20% of the population. Q1 is the lowest 20%, or quintile, and 
Q5 the highest 20%. The higher the number in the group, the more people in that 
group. These quintiles play an important role in measuring income inequality. As 
I will come to explain later, I use the P80/20 ratio to measure HII, which places the 
districts incomes in quintiles. The following table, Table 3, is the composition 
how much of the shared income a decline has. The top decline, 10, has over 25.6% 
of all income in New Zealand.  
Figure 3: Shares of Total Income by Deciles: HES 2013 
 
Source: Bryan Perry, Ministry of Social Development, Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indictors of 
inequality and hardship 1982-2014 (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2015) <https://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-
and-our-work/publications-resources/monitoring/household-incomes/1982-to-2014.html> [accessed 6 February 2017] (pp. 
32-33), p. 40.  Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #6. 
 
The table below indicates a trend wherein higher earners experience increase of 
wealth at a rate higher/faster than those in lower income brackets. 
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Table 3: Real Equivalised Household Incomes (BHC): Decile Boundaries 
(2014, NZ dollars) 
 1982 1986 1990 1994 2001 2004 2007 2010 2011 2013 2014 
P90 50,200 48,000 52,500 48,000 57,800 60,700 63,300 66,500 69,100 71,200 75,400 
P80 42,200 39,200 42,800 38,600 45,500 48,000 50,200 52,700 53,800 55,800 59,100 
P70 36,600 33,200 35,100 32,100 37,800 41,000 41,700 45,000 45,500 48,400 48,900 
P60 32,000 29,400 30,800 27,400 32,600 35,300 36,000 38,900 38,200 41,500 42,100 
P50 27,900 26,400 26,700 23,300 27,500 29,600 31,300 33,800 32,700 34,000 35,700 
P40 24,500 23,300 23,200 19,600 23,100 24,600 27,500 29,600 28,300 29,900 30,700 
P30 21,300 20,800 20,300 17,000 19,600 20,600 23,900 25,700 24,000 25,900 26,000 
P20 18,200 17,800 17,600 15,400 17,000 17,500 19,500 20,600 20,100 21,200 21,300 
P10 15,400 15,000 15,300 12,400 14,800 14,500 15,600 16,900 16,200 17,700 - 
Source: Bryan Perry, Ministry of Social Development, Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indictors of 
inequality and hardship 1982-2014 (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2015) <https://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-
and-our-work/publications-resources/monitoring/household-incomes/1982-to-2014.html> [accessed 6 February 2017] (pp. 
32-33), p. 62.  Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #6. 
 
If we look at Table 3, the 1982 income for group P1 was $15,400, whereas in 
2013, income reached $17,700. This documents that an income difference of 
$2,300 was gained over a 32 year period. If we then compare this with the 
statistics from P90, we see that in 1982 income was $50,200. From 1982 to 2014, 
this income reached $75,400; a gain of $25,200. The differences between the 
wealthy and the less wealthy in equalised household incomes are changing at a 
fast pace. Note that the most increased dispersion period between incomes 
occurred from the late 1980‘s to the mid-1900‘s. It is within this period that the 
New Zealand voting system changed from FPP to MMP and we saw the taxation 
and social reforms that took place.
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Conclusion 
This chapter has shown examples of how income inequality can grow within a 
society. Theorists such as John Rawls and Thomas Hobbes recognise that equal 
opportunity should be given to all but humans have a desire for power. This 
restless desire for paired with the importance society places on capitalism 
produces behaviours such as rent-seeking and using credit instead of saving. With 
the elite few be able to work the current economy in their favour, income 
inequality starts to grow.  
This chapter closely analysed the health repercussions income inequality 
has on society in New Zealand, noting that New Zealand has high rates of 
imprisonment, teenage births, infant mortality and mental illness. It displayed that 
redistribution is not a straightforward solution as commonly thought. New 
Zealand, having a more peculiar history with income inequality than most 
countries, went through economic reforms and a change in the voting system. Has 
once being described as the most equal societies, over a period of forty years more 
or less, has become one of the fastest countries in the world for growth in income 
inequality. Table 4 displayed the growth of income deciles over thirty-two years 
with the bottom deciles income having a $2,300 climb and the top decile having a 
$25,200 income Climb. The three principles of democracy. As Bühlmann stated 
are; equality, freedom and control. From New Zealand‘s rapid changes to income 
groups and the growth in income inequality, New Zealand is far from a state that 
can promote equality as an element of its democracy.  
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Chapter Two: Employment and Voter Turnout  
 
This chapter examines the causal link between employment and voter turnout. It 
attempts to understand what effects employment rates have on voter turnout by 
analysing NZ‘s employment trends and current rates. The study measures 
employment as a variable and contrasts it with levels of voter turnout, specifically, 
whether they are increasing or decreasing as a result of employment or, inversely, 
how unemployment might function as a determining variable of voter turnout. The 
following study attempts to understand how this relationship functions, or whether 
employment determines voter turnout at all.  
Employment as a Variable 
 
New Zealand‘s unemployment rates peaked between 1990 and 1993, reaching 
10.7% in 1992. The lowest rates occurred in 2007 at 3.7%. As indicated on the 
graph below, the flow-on effects of New Zealand‘s economic reforms had an 
impact on society generally.
102
 Unemployment is a key measure for how 
successfully a labour market is performing and is a reflection on current economic 
conditions. The districts that have been the focus of this study have experienced 
unemployment hovering around the 3-5% mark. New Zealand has one of the 
lowest rates of unemployment among the developed countries. In 2014, New 
Zealand‘s employment rate was 5th highest in 34 OECD countries, higher than the 
average.
103
 Below is a graph displaying the unemployment trends from 1986 to 
2014.  
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Figure 2: Unemployment Rate from 1986 to 2014 
 
Source: Ministry of Social Development, The Social Report 2016, (Wellington: New Zealand 
Government, 2016, <http://socialreport.msd.govt.nz> [accessed 30 January 2017] p. 104. 
Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #7. 
Employment and Increasing Voter Turnout 
 
Many Americans have given up on this president but they haven‘t ever 
thought about giving up. Not on themselves. Not on each other. And not 
on America. What is needed in our country today is not complicated or 
profound. It doesn‘t take a special government commission to tell us what 
America needs. What America needs is jobs. Lots of jobs.
104
 
The above quote, by US presidential candidate Mitt Romney, underscores the 
importance of employment as an election topic. The creation of jobs is a topic that 
is bought up in nearly every election campaign.  
Employment is thought to offer individuals resources, and psychological 
reinforcement. Political participation, which includes voting, is integrally tied to 
work, to gainful employment.
105
 It is principally through work that people interact 
with others and actively engage with society. Verba, Schlozman and Brady‘s civic 
voluntarism model,
106
 which is described in more detail below, reinforces this 
argument. The daily practice of decision making and the personal efficacy an 
individual receives after making a decision at work has a positive effect on 
political participation, and is linked in numerous studies to increased voter 
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turnout.
107
 Work provides individuals with the knowledge and skills to make 
political choices. The workplace is typically a hierarchy, linking employment and 
income inequality, and the individual quickly becomes aware of the class structure 
and its very tangible and personal implications.    
The workplace ultimately provides experiences which can motivate an 
individual politically. Schur gives an example in her text, Employment and the 
Creation of an Active Citizenry, where industrial accidents can cause the 
employees to call for higher safety standards and/or create disagreement with 
current laws. Such events can cause individuals to exercise their right to vote, in 
the hope for change. Another example of the workplace-as-political motivation is 
that of discrimination. This is, unfortunately, a common experience in many 
workplaces.  If an employee suffers discrimination, or witnesses another 
individual suffering discrimination based on race, religion or sex, political 
motivation may occur, and can lead to active engagement in the form of voting.
108
  
An important feature of political motivation in the workplace is the 
presence of labour unions. Unions themselves are political bodies that mobilise 
groups to fight for what they believe is right; they advocate for people who 
typically do not have a voice. Offering resources for political participation such as 
information and skills,
109
 unions in the workplace have historically been able to 
mobilise lower income and working class groups.
110
 There has been a vast amount 
of scholarship from Delaney, Masters and Schwochau,
111
 as well as Radcliff
112
 
and Sousa, indicating that union members vote at higher levels than do non-union 
workers.
113
 
 
Key aspects of the civic voluntarism model are money and civic skills. 
Civic skills such as belonging to a group create the basis for sharing ideological 
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ties which may otherwise not happen if an individual is unemployed. If 
unemployed individuals engage with a group, this group is likely to be comprised 
of largely unemployed individuals as well, and is therefore likely to be similarly 
limited as regards its political vision and and understanding.
114
 Verba, Nie and 
Kim are in effect arguing that institutions ultimately facilitate participation.
115
 
Later work on this model from Verba, Schlozman and Brady suggest that the 
workplace provides skills and networks that facilitate political engagement, and 
that this leads to greater and more effective participation.
116
  
There are additional factors that enhance the political impact of the 
workplace.  It is an area, for example, where an individual is exposed to political 
information and opportunities for political mobilisation. If an individual is a 
member of a union, there is a higher chance that this individual will choose to 
vote, and to vote in a consistent and tactical pattern. Employment, in this sense, 
encourages an active citizenry. It can be argued that democracy depends on just 
this sort of engagement. At the very least, democracy depends on active citizens at 
various levels of society.  
Employment and Decreasing Voter Turnout 
 
Contrary to the content provided above, employment may actually 
decrease voter turnout to some degree. A key aspect of political participation is 
the cost and time that it requires, for example standing in line at the polls, finding 
a park, etc. Because time can be a valuable resource, it has been contended that 
employment can act to decrease voter turnout. Charles and Stephen conducted 
research in the USA which found that, at a local level election, ―increased labour 
market activity reduces voters; exposure to political information, increases their 
uncertainty about some elections, and lowers turnout in those elections‖.117 This, 
however, was not found to be applicable for presidential elections or other 
elections with high media exposure. The explanation for this was that salaries 
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preferably are spent on other items rather than voting. The demands of 
employment create less leisure time and an average individual does not want to 
use his or her leisure time to research political information.
118
  When a high 
profile election occurs, however, that research is evident, if not always accurate, 
and the decision to vote, and for whom, or for what to vote, much easier (less 
expensive). 
Time is an interesting factor in relation to employment and voter turnout; a 
person who is unemployed theoretically has greater time than an employed person. 
Studies relating to time and employment have shown both positive and negative 
influences on voter turnout. It has been argued that longer work hours are linked 
to lower levels of political participation for women, but not necessarily for men.
119
 
This could be based on the greater demands of simultaneously working and 
managing a family. On the other hand, longer working hours have been associated 
with greater interest in politics and with greater civic engagement.  
When someone has ‗adequate‘ employment, individually defined,120 there 
may be little motivation to engage in political participation. This could be for a 
number of reasons: the individual‘s level of work satisfaction, seeing no personal 
reason to seek government intervention, or a sense in a depressed economy that he 
or she is lucky to have a job. Such arguments could apply to high-income earners 
as well as those earning more modest incomes.  It could be that the workplace is 
offering a stable or safe environment, and that any personal disagreements could 
be resolved at work, without resorting to the government, and hence the 
irrelevance of the vote. The employee, as noted above, may have a good work/life 
balance, with low-stress levels, and finds work enjoyable.  In each of these cases, 
basic employee satisfaction may serve to attenuate the desire to vote.    
 
Unemployment Increasing Voter Turnout 
 
As noted above, it is likely that unemployment increases political 
participation. Burden and Wichowsky established in their research from the 1976-
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2008 elections in the USA that, at the state level at least, states with higher 
unemployment rates have had higher rates of voter turnout.
 121
  Their research 
confirmed that the voting preferences of these unemployed were based on the 
candidates‘ economic policies and proposals.122Socio-economic reasons, then, 
have been primary motivational factors in voter turnout. If individual blame the 
government for their unemployment, they will tend to turn to the voting booth to 
express their frustration.  Lipset outlined this causal relation:  
groups subject to economic pressures, such as inflation, depression, 
monopolistic exploitation, or structural changes in the economy, might 
also be expected to turn to government action [to seek a solution].
123
  
Economic hardship can produce a political readiness to vote in elections, and act 
as a strong motivator. Arceneaux, who studied the American presidential elections 
from 1990-1998 apparently agreed with Lipset‘s points: he hypothesised that 
unemployment could increase voter turnout, but argued that this only happens 
when the unemployed blame the government for their hardship.
124
 Without 
blaming the government, the individual may just see their unemployment as a 
problem that they have created themselves, and will self-blame instead of blaming 
the government, which does not incentivise voting.  
Incantalupo undertook a more focused study in comparing voter turnout of 
those who were unemployed before Election Day to those who were unemployed 
after Election Day.
125
 The results were inconclusive. From 1996 and 2000, job 
losses had a significant negative effect on voter turnout, but in 2008 and 2010, 
there were positive effects on voter turnout. He found that when there is a large 
group of people who are unemployed, the effect was more positive on voter 
turnout. Perhaps there is an analogue with many people in the same boat. They are 
likely to work towards resolving their predicament cooperatively.  
                                                          
121
 Barry D. Burden and Amber Wichowsky. ‗Unemployment and Voter Turnout‘ in  Annual 
Meeting of (Madison, n.pub, 2012) pp 1-19 (p. 15) 
<http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/behavior/Papers/Burden%26Wichowsky2012.pdf> [accessed 6 
February 2017]. 
122
 Burden and Wichowsky, p. 15. 
123
 Seymour Lipset, Political man (New York: Doubleday, 1960) p. 192. 
124
 Kevin Arceneaux, ‗The Conditional Impact of Blame Attribution on the Relationship Between 
Economic Adversity and Turnout‘, Political Research Quarterly, 56 (2003) 67-75.   
125
 Matthew Incantalupo, ‗The Effects of Unemployment on Voter Turnout in U.S National 
Elections‘ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 2011).  
  
40 
Unemployment in a time of job shortage is a stressful and depressing 
condition for an individual. As mentioned above, emotions are thought to 
determine political choice and participation. Unemployment under these 
conditions is thought by many scholars, such as Feather and O‘Brien,126 as well as 
Linn, Sandifer and Stein,
127
 to lead to depression, withdrawal from politics, and 
anger. Aytac, Rau and Stokes completed a study using the Current Population 
Study data, and found that the length of time that an individual is unemployed has 
an inverse impact on the likelihood of voting. Although unemployment has a 
negative effect on voter turnout, the longer the period of unemployment, the 
greater is the likelihood of voting.
128
 Unemployment can act as a political 
motivator–provided that the job loss or lack of jobs is blamed on the government. 
This blame will tend to rally groups of unemployed to vote.  
Unemployment and Decreased Voter Turnout 
 
As research has noted (above), unemployment can increase voter turnout, 
although, depending upon the circumstances, it can also decrease voter turnout. 
Steven J. Rosenstone, in ‗Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout‘, found that the 
unemployed, the less wealthy, and the financially troubled are, in general,  less 
likely to vote. He found that it wasn‘t only the costs that are involved with voting,  
but that other life circumstances lowered voting as a personal priority.
129
 
Rosenstone referred to a reference by Rainwater and Voyondoff, which noted that 
when an individual is unemployed, there tends to be a breakdown in relationships 
with co-workers, friends and spouses. These relationships are often key elements 
in the provision of political information.
130
 The less wealthy may be distracted 
with personal economic concerns and job seeking. According to Rosenstone, 
―when a person experiences economic adversity his scarce resources are spent on 
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holding body and soul together – surviving – not on remote concerns like 
politics‖.131 For the unemployed, survival may preclude lower priorities of a 
political nature.  
The blame that is assigned for unemployment is an important determinant 
of whether a given individual decides to vote. Unemployment can bring with it a 
sense of embarrassment and, because of this, a reticence to voice an opinion 
regarding governmental policy. Unemployment easily becomes a very personal 
matter.
132
  
Sidney Verba and Norman Nie applied what they called the ‗Civic 
Voluntarism Model‘,133 to attempt to explain some of the inconsistencies in voter 
turnout modelling.  Their model was first used to describe political participation 
in the USA, but has also been used to explain political participation in Britain.
134
 
This model focuses on three reasons why a person might not participate in politics: 
lack of resources; psychological engagement; and isolation from political 
networks (e.g., unemployment). These might be reduced in some respects to 
shortages of time, money, and civic skills.
135
  
A shortage of free time has been used in the past as an argument as to why 
the employed might be less disposed to vote, although Verba, Schozmand and 
Brady argue that this is a weak argument.
136
 Studies have demonstrated that even 
though an unemployed individual may have more time to watch television, for 
example, an unemployed American is less likely to watch the news or political 
events than an employed American.
137
  
 
Obstacles to voting, moreover, must be seen in the context of ‗opportunity costs‘, 
as Rosenstone observes:   
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When the return from attending to an immediate, stressful personal 
problem, such as unemployment, is greater than the return from 
participating in politics, the opportunity costs of participation are higher. 
The higher the opportunity costs, the lower the possibility the citizen will 
participate in politics.
138
 
 
Rosenstone and Hansen put Rosenstone‘s earlier theory to the test and found that 
the unemployed are 2.7% less likely to vote in presidential elections in the USA 
and 8.5% are less likely to vote in the midterms.
139
 He argues that the reason for 
this is that the perceived payoffs appear more immediate in the national 
elections.
140
 When all of the potential factors, such as smaller social groups, 
embarrassment, and self-blame due to unemployment are combined, individual 
may tend not to vote. The stress of job seeking and financial pressures, at the very 
least, would seem to place voting at the lower end of their priorities.  
Employment Status Has Little Effect on Voter Turnout 
 
Employment may not have very much of an effect on voter turnout. As Kinder 
and Kiewiet put it ―economic discounts and political judgements inhabit separate 
mental domains‖.141 Kinder and Kiewiet completed a study using congressional 
elections in the USA from 1956 to 1976 which found that those who were 
unhappy with their financial situation or who were recently unemployed were 
unlikely to punish candidates for their personal grievances. Arcelus and Meltzer 
completed a study that examined turnout and partisan division congressional 
voting between 1896 and 1970. They found that the unemployment percentage 
had ―little systematic effect on the participation rate‖.142 Fiorina found in his study 
that ―at a micro level there are no discernible relationships between economic 
conditions and voting turnout‖.143 These studies directly disputed the contention 
that employment status has an effect on voter turnout. However, when 
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employment status is thought to be caused by the government, it is clear that 
turnout may, indeed, be affected.   
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has pointed to New Zealand‘s currently low unemployment rates 
while attempting to disaggregate the impact of unemployment on voter turnout.  
Studies have repeatedly demonstrated that unemployment, even at low levels, can 
have an impact on voter turnout, particularly if the unemployed blame the 
government for their unemployed status. This factor, blame for unemployed status, 
seems to be the most important element in determining whether an individual 
chooses to vote. Hence, even relatively low unemployment rates, as exist in New 
Zealand, can cause lowered voter turnout in regions where the unemployed blame 
the government for their condition.  
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Chapter Three: Income Inequality and Voting Preferences 
 
This chapter examines income inequality as a factor in the determination of voter 
preferences. It attempts to relate New Zealand ‘s three most popular political 
parties and their distinctive voting patterns with their current polices. The chapter 
then traces variables that may have an effect when voters choose a political party. 
It concludes with an examination of income inequality, and why it is that citizens 
apparently often choose to vote against their own material interests.   
New Zealand Political Parties and Policies  
 
New Zealand has a multi-party system, and hence several parties have the 
opportunity in any given election of achieving power, either as a dominant party 
or, more likely, in a coalition.  Over the last four elections, three parties stand out: 
the National Party, the Labour Party, and the Green Party of Aotearoa. These 
parties have received by far the most votes.  Over the next pages, I will investigate 
their origins, their policies, and their voters.  
The Green Party of Aotearoa/New Zealand  
 
This party was originally founded at Victoria University in May 1972 under the 
banner of the ‗Values Party‘. In May 1990 the Green Party of Aotearoa New 
Zealand was formed from Values party and similar groups. The Party currently 
has 14 seats in parliament and is considered to be left-of-centre, perhaps further 
from centre than Labour. 
The ‗Green‘ Party is known in New Zealand as ‗a liberal party that focuses 
on environmental issues‘.144 The vision of the party, as offered on their official 
website, includes the message that Aotearoa New Zealand is a place where people 
respect each other and the natural world. It is healthy, peaceful and richly 
diverse.
145
 The party places an emphasis on ecological living, fair trade, human 
rights, and peace.  
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On a recent mail-out entitled ‗Green News,‘ the Party stated that ―We‘re 
committed to protecting the environment we love and providing a better life for 
all who live in our beautiful country‖146and ―we see a future where all our families 
can go swimming in New Zealand‘s rivers and lakes‖.147  
The Green Party of Aotearoa has focused on several keystone policies as 
of July 2016. The first is that of ‗safer, cleaner freight.‘ The goal of this policy is 
to reduce the number of trucks on New Zealand‘s roads, and to replace the 
movement of New Zealand‘s road freight with rail and sea. Bearing the slogan 
‗we can make roads safer and the air cleaner,‘148 the second policy focuses on 
‗homes not cars‘, and focuses on the Green Party‘s plan to build hundreds of state 
homes by allowing Housing  New Zealand to retain its dividend and refund its tax, 
thereby freeing up $207 million to spend on building 450 new emergency 
homes.
149
 The third major policy posited by the Green Party begins with the view 
that ‗Kiwibank can get low rates for all of us.‘150 To achieve this, the Green Party 
proposes to inject a further $100 million of capital into Kiwibank to facilitate its 
expansion into commercial banking, thus allowing Kiwibank to keep more of its 
profits, accelerate its growth, and thereby give Kiwibank a clear public mandate to 
lead the market in passing on interest rate cuts.
151
 The fourth major policy is ‗safe 
to school‘, which proposes to create safe walking and cycling routes for children 
to get to school. This should also reduce congestion in the cities.
152
 
The Labour Party  
 
The Labour Party was established on 7 July 1916 from a variety of similar parties. 
The party currently has 43 seats in parliament and is considered centre-left wing. 
The vision from the Labour party on their website states includes the following:
 
 
                                                          
146
 James Shaw and Metiria Turei Green Party Co-leaders Green ‗Green News‘, (Parliament 
Buildings, Wellington, 2016). 
147
 James Shaw and Metiria Turei Green Party Co-leaders Green, p. 2. 
148
 Green Party of Aotearoa, Safer, cleaner freight, Green, updated 2016, < 
https://www.greens.org.New Zealand /policy/cleaner-environment/safer-cleaner-freight > 
[accessed 20 November 2016].  
149
 Green Party of Aotearoa, Homes Not Cars, Green, updated 2016,  < 
https://www.greens.org.New Zealand /policy/fairer-society/homes-not-cars > [accessed 20 
November 2016]. 
150
 Green Party of Aotearoa, Smarter Economy, Green, updated 2016,  < 
https://www.greens.org.New Zealand /policy/smarter-economy/kiwibank-can-get-low-rates-all-us 
> [accessed 20 November 2016]. 
151
 Green Party of Aotearoa, ‗Smarter Economy‘. 
152
 Green Party of Aotearoa, ‗Smarter Economy‘. 
  
46 
Labour backs the kiwi dream…It‘s a home to call our own. Opportunities for 
everyone‘s kids to succeed, no matter where they live. Security and freedom to 
make our own choices. Pride in our independence and a passion for our 
environment.
153
 
 
 As their website suggests, when Kiwis need homes, Labour builds them, and 
when Kiwis need work, Labour creates it.
154
  
  Labour has stated that following the 2014 election, the party has placed all 
its policies under review and will continue to announce new policies up to the 
2017 election, to include the ‗Working futures‘ policy. This policy is for three 
years of free higher education over a person‘s lifetime, and can be used at any 
point. They also propose ‗flexible tax for business.‘ This includes an entirely 
flexible voluntary withholding tax, which will allow businesses to meet their tax 
obligations at a rate of their choosing and on their own time table.
155
 Labour also 
aims to introduce a ‗Young Entrepreneurs Policy‘, where young New Zealanders 
can apply to cash in their three years of free education and receive a grant to start 
up their own businesses.  They can also receive training and a business mentor. 
Finally, there is the ‗Our Work Our Future‘ policy, which is designed to ensure 
that the Government focuses on creating more jobs. This will be complemented 
by government organisations issuing contracts with winning bids based on the 
creation of jobs in New Zealand. Organisations that design contracts so that 
companies focus on creating more jobs in New Zealand will have a fair chance of 
winning the contracts.
156
 
The New Zealand National Party  
 
This party was established in 1936 by a coalition of the United and Reform parties 
as well as a several other similar parties. The Party currently has 59 seats in 
parliament and is considered centre-right wing. 
  The New Zealand National Party website describes its mission as follows: 
―The National Party seeks a safe, prosperous, and successful New Zealand that 
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creates opportunities for all New Zealanders to reach their personal goals and 
dreams‖.157 The website uses the slogan ‗Less debt, more jobs, strong stable 
government‘.158 
  The National Party‘s website did not list their policies in order, as did the 
other parties, but rather provided the following information on their homepage: 
first, there is a section entitled ‗Helping Rural Communities‘, which bears the 
description, ―A successful primary sector is part of National‘s plan to create more 
jobs, life incomes, and build a more productive and competitive economy‖.159 The 
focus here is on helping families get ahead – notably through health care, boosting 
irrigation, and growing the primary sector through a ‗Primary Growth 
Partnership‘, as well as supporting exporters, managing resources, and improving 
broadband connectivity. There is, as well, the aim to ‗help more Kiwis buy their 
first home,‘ This is ostensibly to be achieved by using Kiwisaver and government 
grants for low to middle-income couples. ‗Better healthcare‘ is also proposed with 
a focus on delivering better results for New Zealanders and their families and, 
from the money that this is expected to generate, it is assumed that there will be 
―less waiting, more operations and more doctors and nurses‖160 Finally, the 
National Party proposes to ‗help small businesses in New Zealand.‘ The website 
states that ―small businesses are the backbone of the New Zealand economy – 
they account for around 97% of business in New Zealand.‖161 This ‗help‘ will be 
achieved from the recent introduction of a business-focused tax package that, it is 
thought, will be supportive of small businesses.  
  The outline of the parties, while very basic, offers some background into 
voting behaviour.  Why do voters make the choices that they make? To explain 
what motivates an individual‘s vote, there are several models that have been 
extensively researched. These include, but are not limited to, the rational choice 
model, the resources model, the mobilisation model, the social-psychological 
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model interpretation, and civic voluntarism model.
162
 Taking into account that 
income inequality and employment may affect for whom an individual decides to 
vote, it is not the only contributing factor that an individual may draw upon when 
deciding to vote.   
  This section includes both emotion and religion as elements. Emotion can 
be linked to income as making ends meet can be difficult at times, for all income 
groups. Religion is included as well: many religious groups, for example, include 
people of lower incomes and relate the plights of their members to apocalyptic 
visions that can only intensify stress levels. Such groups seem to vote against 
parties who might benefit them, and instead often vote against their own interests. 
For this paper, I do not treat emotion or religion as variables, but rather 
acknowledge that unemployment in itself fosters many relationships, and this is 
likewise the case with income inequality.  
Variables Relating to Party Voting Preferences 
 
A psychological approach relates political behaviour with emotion: personal 
emotions, in this approach, have an impact on voting. It is common practice for 
candidates to use emotional appeals in political campaigns, and this is often 
geared to have a negative effect on the opposition.
163
 Different emotions that can 
affect voting preferences include, but are not limited to, surprise, anger, anxiety, 
fear, and pride.  
Emotions, Campaigns, and Political Participation is a study that examined 
the behavioural impact of four commonly employed emotional appeals in 
advertisements: anger, sadness, fear, and enthusiasm.
164
 This study found that 
while anger prompted political engagement, fear and sadness lessened 
engagement.
165
 Anger seems to be a strong political tactic, and appears to increase 
political engagement, although it is equally likely that political action based on 
negative emotion can lead to biases, and not ―necessarily thoughtful 
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participation‖.166 Individuals may vote, but not put much thought into which party 
they will vote for. The theory of affective intelligence suggests that campaign 
participation is driven by anxiety and enthusiasm; it apparently causes the average 
person to become ‗emotionally involved‘.167 Emotions play a vital role in a 
person‘s decision to take part in an activity.  Unemployment, as discussed earlier, 
can encourage voting if individuals blame the government for their unemployment. 
This blame can often be translated into anger. Studies researching the emotional 
effects of unemployment have found that as individuals experienced more 
unemployment, their tendency to experience depression also increased.
168
 Anger, 
an emotion that is likely to be experienced by the unemployed, can perhaps 
contribute to this political engaging of voters. Other demographic influences on 
voting patterns include gender, race, age, culture and religion. Without going into 
too much depth on this particular topic, and while still acknowledging that these 
also have a strong influence on voting, I will focus on religion and income. 
Religious groups often vote conservatively. In a collective sense, beliefs are often 
conservative, and tend to express little concern for the economic wellbeing of 
their proponents. Although some of the more religious individuals may fall into 
lower income groups, religious collectives constitute one of the categories that 
potentially would not tend to be significantly affected by economic issues in 
elections.  This category, then, may shed some light on a perplexing electoral 
dynamic: why it is that some people, particularly less wealthy people, routinely 
vote against their immediate  economic interests.  
De La O has completed research which considers whether religion causes 
an inverse relationship between income and left-of-centre voting (any vote that is 
leftist). They found that when determining a religious person‘s vote, it is best to 
look at moral as opposed to economic‘ interests‘. De La O discusses the idea that 
less wealthy people, for example, may not even understand, or value, their 
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economic interests. As discussed in the following chapter, this can be the case for 
a number of reasons, such as not believing that their voice will be heard. This 
study led to a finding that economic preferences made it easier in the USA to 
predict voting behaviour, but that it was inversely related to interests in several 
relatively religious European countries with multiparty systems.
169
 When religion 
is present, it can be difficult to determine electoral outcomes; income may 
determine outcomes to some extent or, alternatively, religious beliefs may 
contribute to an alignment with conservative parties. Emotion, unemployment and 
religion all complicate voting preferences.   
Why it is that an individual chooses to vote for a particular  party, then, 
can have a number of determinant factors.  Such factors are tacitly and even 
unconsciously ranked, and it is therefore difficult to predict for whom an 
individual will vote.   The section below will examine yet another variable – 
income inequality. For this thesis I have used household income as my measure of 
inequality. Statistics  New Zealand considers household income as the clearest 
basis for measuring income inequality, although it should be noted at this juncture 
that in some of the studies cited below it was unclear if personal income or 
household income was used as the measure of inequality.  
Who Votes for Whom 
 
It is important at the outset to establish which party sits on the left- and right-of-
centre.  In Chapter Six, votecompass is introduced in order to situate the three 
largest political parties of New Zealand on a scale from left to right. The National 
Party is said to be  centre-right, Labour , centre-left, and the Green Party, further 
to the left.  
As income inequality has intensified, there is a greater separation between 
the wealthy and the less wealthy than ever before.
170
 Based on existing 
scholarship, it contended that those of higher socioeconomic status are more likely 
to vote and have a lower probability of voting for the left-of-centre parties.
171
 As 
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regards the US, Gelman, Kenworthy and Su note that the Republican Party 
represents the interests of business establishments, and the Democratic Party 
represents labour and groups in the public sector, including teachers and 
government employees; members of the Democratic Party tend to be of lower 
income.
172
  
In trying to determine which societal groups are more likely to vote on the 
left or right, numerous studies have that that citizens who favour income equality, 
more state intervention and who are more libertarian in their lifestyles are more 
likely to vote for the left-of-centre.
173
 Nevertheless, economic positions seemed to 
matter less to women when choosing for whom to vote, and in many instances, 
despite being economically positioned on the left-of-centre, women voted to the 
right-of-centre.
174
 The research in this area is extensive and tends to agree in most 
cases that the less wealthy vote left-of-centre, and the wealthy vote right-of-centre. 
Linking this to redistribution, Meltzer and Richard predicted that people with 
incomes below the medium will tend to vote with the left-of-centre for 
redistribution polices.
175
 
Argued by the likes of Leighley and Nagler,
176
 as well as, Cai and 
Voces,
177
 voter turnout is almost always lower with working classes. In Britain, a 
survey was completed in 1992 for the purposes of knowing what way a given 
economic class was likely to vote. The results were predictable: 56% of the ‗non-
manual‘ workers (professions) voted Conservative, whereas 51% of the ‗manual‘ 
(tradesman) workers voted for Labour.
178
 Even below the manual workers, 
however, we would predict that the less wealthy in general should vote on the left-
of-centre, particularly as inequality intensifies: ―the poor masses in unequal 
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societies should vote for parties of the left that promise confiscatory levels of 
taxation and redistribution‖179 
The ‗left vote‘ should, then, have larger numbers particularly when more 
voter turnout of the less wealthy and working classes is high. This argument is 
familiar throughout this thesis. To their own disadvantage, the less wealthy and 
working class individuals, ―who are the natural constituency of left parties tend to 
vote at lower and more variable rates than the higher-status supporters of centre or 
right parties.‖180 Perhaps, left-of-centre parties should move their focus to voter 
turnout and in return, more left-of-centre parties would be voted in to office. This 
is supported by Daniel Horn: ―If fewer people vote, then relatively more rich 
people vote, so median voter income will be larger, which decreases taxes 
(meaning lower redistribution)‖.181 Which is similar to both the works of Muller 
and Stratmann,
182
 and Meltzer and Richard.
183
  
Voting does not occur in a vacuum.  The studies cited above point to the 
vital link between voting preference and income.  If less wealthy individuals tend 
to vote for left-of-centre parties, then presumably when income inequality is high, 
and lower income groups in society are rising in numbers, we should be seeing 
stronger voting support for the left-of-centre. As noted above, however, this is not 
always the case. Voter preference is often offset by voter turnout. 
Citizens Voting against Their Interests  
 
People generally vote for parties that represent their struggles and economic 
positions. This is simply rational behaviour. It is difficult, then, to understand why 
individuals would vote against their interests.  It has been argued that with the 
standard of living slowly improving over the last two centuries, there has been a 
shift of priorities from economic issues to social and cultural issues.
184
 Income 
inequality, which has an economic base, is also a social issue, however. Acterberg 
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and Houtman argue that less wealthy citizens compete with one another for work, 
because of this working people will tend to be hostile towards immigration, for 
example, and may vote for right-of-centre parties that oppose immigration.
185
 
Such parties have much broader platforms than anti-immigration, but this one 
issue has emotional appeal.  A vote in this case can be associated with economic 
competition that has developed as a result of income inequality. Such ‗unnatural‘ 
voting is ultimately related to cultural capital (progressiveness/conservatism).
186
 
Acterberg and Houtman suggest that members of the working class, who may 
have a small amount of cultural capital, adhere to culturally conservative values 
that then lead on to right wing votes. While a contrary vote might have been 
expected of from a working class, the results of research demonstrate that the 
more culturally active one is, the more likely he or she is to vote for the Greens 
than for the Socialist Party, at least in a European country.
187
 Corneo and Gruner, 
on the other hand, propose that the middle classes are in competition with the 
lower and upper classes. They explain that individuals within a social class where;
 
 
Social prestige measured by income is higher than that of individuals from 
lower socioeconomic statuses but only slightly lower than those from 
socioeconomic statuses higher than their own, are more likely to favor 
political decision that reject an equal distribution of economic resources.
188
 
 
Another study found that moral values ―actually pushed individuals in the 
opposite direction from their economic preferences…we find that the moral 
values [have] a large impact on the vote in many countries with multiparty 
systems.‖189 Could it be that more people voted for New Zealand‘s National Party 
despite having low-incomes because of morality questions? Labour has been an 
unstable party since Helen Clark resigned in 2008.   Could it be that the concept 
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of trust is pushing New Zealanders to vote against their economic interests?  As 
Ana stated: 
at least since Marx and Engels, one of the most prominent [features of the 
lower class is that they] do not naturally come to understand their 
economic self-interest in progressive taxation and redistribution.
190
  
Without that economic self-interest functioning as motivation, voting is ultimately 
influenced by cultural. This perspective, comprised of emotion, media and 
numerous other factors, may obfuscate an awareness of income inequality, 
something that perhaps was not a point of interest in the past but has slowly come 
to light over the past decade.  
Thomas Frank canvased voting patterns in the US Midwest in the first 
decade of this century, and discovered that the results were unpredictable.
191
 
People angrily rejected policies that were firmly in their economic interests, and 
supported the policies of the wealthy.  One might think that with the Labour Party 
in New Zealand being centre-eft, liberals would be expected to vote for it, and 
conservatives would be expected to vote for the National Party. Frank, in his 
examination of the US, offers a cultural and emotional explanation of why this is 
not the case:  
 
Out here the gravity of discontent pulls in only one direction: to the right, 
to the right, further to the right. Strip today's Kansans of their job security, 
and they head out to become registered Republicans. Push them off their 
land, and next thing you know they're protesting in front of abortion 
clinics.
192
  
 
These are people who, from the perspective of their objective interests, would 
appear to be on the left-of-centre, but gravitate emotionally and culturally to the 
right-of-centre when under duress. They may not have manifested Republican 
Party interests, strictly speaking (although the farmers and small business people 
of the American Midwest did tend to be Republicans after William McKinley 
revived the Republican Party in the 1890s), but their votes, clearly in opposition 
to their immediate vital economic interests, were the product of frustration and 
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discontent, as Frank says. This ties into the argument regarding emotion and 
voting made earlier in this section. If the less wealthy do not vote with their 
interests (income redistribution), then it is unlikely that the economic well-being 
of the less wealthy will be addressed. From a rational standpoint, the less wealthy 
are more likely to support left-wing parties that advocate redistribution from the 
wealthy to the less wealthy.
193
 As discussed above, New Zealand is similar to the 
USA in the sense that liberals are voting for conservative values, and thus against 
redistribution.
194
  Is  New Zealand a conservative country? It has been found that 
richer states in the USA tend to favour the Democrats
 195
 and yet the nation as a 
whole has a large wealthy  population more likely to vote Republican.
196
 This, 
then, raises a troubling question: does New Zealand have traditional class/income 
voting patterns, where the more you earn, the more right-of-centre you are, or is it 
that New Zealand is more of a reflection of Kansas and is largely comprised of 
people voting against their immediate economic interests?  
Conclusion: Party Preferences 
 
Studies have shown that economic standing determines voting preferences, at 
least to some extent.  The wealthy tend to vote conservative, the less wealthy, for -
of-centre parties. Over time, this trend seems to have changed, however.  I have 
argued that income inequality was once an economic issue, but is now more of a 
social issue. It is present as a recurrent topic in the media, and may be creating a 
change in voting patterns. Individuals seem to be voting based upon their own 
ethical standards, and often contrary to their immediate economic interests. 
Income inequality seems to be exacerbating this trend.   
 
Chapter Four: Income Inequality and Voter Turnout 
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In this chapter, NZ‘s voter turnout statistics are analysed along with popular 
reasons why individuals choose not to vote. This chapter then examines three 
theoretical arguments regarding the relationship between income inequality and 
voter turnout: income inequality as a primary cause of a reduction in voter turnout; 
income inequality as a primary cause in an increase in voter turnout; and the 
argument that income inequality has no bearing on voter turnout. These 
contrasting arguments are obviously integral to any discussion of the relationship 
between income inequality and voter turnout.  
Voter Turnout in New Zealand 
 
Voter turnout in New Zealand is defined as ―the proportion of the estimated 
voting-age population (aged 18 years and over) who cast a vote in general 
elections.‖197 Voter turnout rates are an indication of the confidence the 
population has in a political system. It also demonstrates the importance that 
individuals attach to political groups. Within the last 30 years, voter turnout has 
undergone dramatic changes in New Zealand. In 1984 voter turnout reached a 
high of 89%. In 2011 it was at a low of 70%.
198
 Turnout, over time has been in 
decline, as displayed on the graph below. A survey was conducted in an attempt to 
understand why people were foregoing their right to vote. The New Zealand 
General Social Survey found that for the 2008 and 2011 elections, 21% did not 
vote because, in the words non-voters, they ―didn‘t get around to it, forgot, or 
were not interested‖, 12.3% did not register, 10% were ―overseas or away on 
election day‖ and 7.1% said they did not think their vote would make a 
difference.
199
 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of estimated voting – age population who cast votes, 
1984-2014 
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Source: Ministry of Social Development, The Social Report 2016, (Wellington: New Zealand 
Government, 2016, <http://socialreport.msd.govt.nz> [accessed 30 January 2017] p. 154. 
Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #7. 
The survey also examined the characteristics of non-voters, and found that 
unemployed people were less likely to vote compared with employed people. The 
survey found that 35.2% of unemployed people did not vote, while only 17.8% 
who were in the labour force did not vote.
200
 The survey also measured income. It 
found that incomes under $70,000 were more likely not to vote than people with 
incomes above $70,000.
201
 New Zealand voter turnout was ranked 9
th
 highest out 
of the 34 OECD countries and was higher than the OECD average.  
The 2011 election was recorded as having the lowest voter turnout in New 
Zealand since 1887. The official turnout rate was 74.2%. Jack Vowels argued that, 
regardless of changing the voting system from FFP to MMP, voter turnout 
changes in waves, and the reasons why an individual may not vote are almost 
endless.
 202
 Vowels has argued that since the 2005 election there has been ―less 
attention to coalition options because of the campaign‘s focus on the two major 
parties.‖203 In the 2008 and 2011 elections, the National party and Labour party 
―refuse(d) to debate together with leaders of the smaller parties‖204 Vowels 
reiterates that such perceptions are also encouraged when parties fail to form pre-
election coalitions, and that if public perceptions of closeness were construed on 
                                                          
200
 Ministry of Social Development, The Social Report 2016, p. 154. 
201
 Ministry of Social Development, The Social Report 2016, p. 154. 
202
 Jack Vowels, ‗Down, Down, Down: Turnout in New Zealand from 1946 to the 2011 Election‘, 
in New Zealand Political Science Association Conference, (New Zealand, n. pub, 2012), pp. 1-28 
(p. 2), < http://www.nzes.org/docs/papers/nzpsa_2012.pdf> [accessed 6 February 2017].  
203
 Vowels, p.22. 
204
 Vowels, p.22. 
  
58 
the basis of clearer ‗centre-left‘ versus ‗centre-right‘ coalitions, we could expect 
higher turnouts.
205
 
The Social Report, found that the 2011 election voter turnout was much 
lower for individuals in lower age groups, among the unemployed, and among 
those on low-incomes.
206
 The main reason for lower voter turnout in 2011 was not 
getting around to voting, forgetting to vote, or lack of interest, according to the 
Social Report.
207
 This shared apathy contrasts with reasons listed in the 2008 
election, when only 3.9% said that they did not vote because they did not believe 
their vote would make a difference. In 2011, this response had climbed to 7.1%.
208
 
 Income Inequality and Reduced Voter Turnout  
 
The Relative Power Theory predicts that inequality will depress voter turnout.
209
 
This is said to a result from an inverse relationship between income inequality and 
voter turnout. As suggested by Jamie Castillo, less wealthy citizens will refrain 
from politics because they don‘t believe their voices will be heard.210 Assuming 
that their votes will, in fact, have little influence, this point of view makes some 
sense. Goodin and Dryzek have made a similar argument. They contend that the 
stronger that economic power is within the elite, the more the less wealthy 
withdraw from political participation, that is, projecting their political concerns.
211
 
Thus, in this view, political effectiveness is likely to be based on an individual‘s 
economic position in society, that is, driven by relative income.
212
 The futility in 
voting that is felt by lower income individuals becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.
213
 This is explicitly anti-democratic, and raises an uncomfortable 
question: is New Zealand a democratic society? Indeed, are most Western 
societies today, dominated as they are by this dynamic, democratic?  Aristotle 
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observed that  ―the rich everywhere are few, and the poor numerous . . . where the 
less wealthy rule, that is a democracy‖.214 In a ‗developed‘ world increasingly 
populated by lower income groups, but where the wealthy nevertheless dominate, 
are we witnessing the breakdown of democracies?   
This impression was supported in Bartles‘ research, which found that in 
the USA federal senators were more responsive to the opinions of high-income 
constituents.
215
 Solt‘s study, moreover, produced results that were consistent with 
the Relative Power Theory: income inequality apparently had an inverse effect on 
political participation regarding groups with middle-to-low incomes. He argued, 
however, that inequality ―does not encourage more political engagement among 
any income group‖. 216 He noted, instead, that inequality generally had an inverse 
relationship across all groups, although with middle-to-low income groups this 
effect was more pronounced, and much more deleterious. He reinforced his results 
in a 2010 study using Schattschneider‘s hypothesis, which argued that high-
incomes along with a state of pronounced inequality leads to low political 
participation rates.
217
  Solt found similar evidence in his 2008 work (cited above), 
and added that income inequality has a significant inverse relationship with voter 
turnout, although higher income earners tend to vote more as inequality rises. 
218
 
Resource theory implies that the more resources one has, the more likely 
he or she is to vote. So, in this sense, voter turnout can be seen as  dependant upon 
one‘s income. I suggest that time, in addition to income, is an integral resource. 
Spare time can be allocated to political participation, thought given to political 
policy, and time and energy ‗allocated‘ to engagement in political activities such 
as discussion, protest, and voting. Without time, it is difficult to imagine that an 
individual would be able to engage effectively in the political sphere. Such ‗extra‘ 
time is closely related to the arguments surrounding employment and voting. The 
wealthy simply have more time and more resources, and are, in principle at least, 
more capable of spending their time and resources on political endeavours. Given 
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that the less wealthy tend to regard their political participation as futile, they are 
simply less likely to devote whatever limited spare time that they have to it.  
Political polarisation is another explanation as to why inequality tends to 
exercise a inverse relationship with voting. Jamie-Castillo argues that the higher 
polarisation within the political parties, the harder it is to form coalitions. Without 
coalitions, decision making regarding party preferences becomes more difficult, 
and this can lower the turnout among the less wealthy and middle classes, 
allowing power to concentrate in the upper classes. Nevertheless, those earning 
higher incomes may also have lower voter turnout because of their assured 
political success rates: the lower classes‘ consistent inability to control 
parliament.
219
 With their interests already well protected, moreover, those in the 
middle class will tend to ally with the wealthy in maintaining their, albeit limited, 
positions.  
When inequality is low, on the other hand, the middle classes will tend to 
ally with the less wealthy and working classes in the interests of gaining more 
redistributive policies.
220
 Geys research looks at 83 aggregate-level studies to 
determine why it is that individuals turn out on Election Day. As regards income 
inequality, Geys study found, based on 13 test results, that there was an inverse 
relationship between income inequality and voting; six test results showed that 
this was a positive relationship and thirteen tests that had insignificant results.
221
 
So overall there would be a trend of  high inequality and lower voter turnout.  
Income Inequality and Increased Voter Turnout 
 
Income inequality, alternatively, also links strongly with increased voter turnout. 
This is supported by Lister, whose research spanned fifteen wealthy countries, and 
demonstrated that welfare states, including New Zealand, when income inequality 
was low, evinced a pattern in which voter turn out was high. This was said to be 
because welfare states encouraged solidarity and participation.
222
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Conflict theory proposes that people are more likely to participate in 
politics when levels of inequality are high. The greater the differences are between 
societal groups, the greater the frustration, and in turn, the more people are likely 
to vote. Societies tend to have more conflict when there is greater inequality; 
participation is thus greater in response to these differences (generated by conflict).  
The inverse of this argument is that when inequality is low there should be fewer 
demands on government. Income inequality, it would appear, should on balance 
encourage mobilization and political awareness. Redistributive polices become 
more attractive and are simply the best means for the less wealthy to improve their 
situation.  
Political polarisation has already been discussed as a factor that may 
restrain  political participation, although there is disagreement regarding this point.   
Brady observed income, income inequality and participation from the 1970‘s 
through to the 1990‘s, and demonstrated that  ―Increasing income inequality might 
operate in contradictory ways by reducing the wherewithal for lower income 
people to participate but simultaneously increasing their motivation to become 
engaged.‖223 As Brady notes, lower income levels may restrain participation, but 
may also motivate participation. Oliver would agree with Brady as in his study, he 
found that inequality polarises the different income groups and thereby leads to 
participation.
224
 
When people decide to vote, it is generally based on personal cost. The 
neo-material argument employs the Downsian rational voter theory.
225
 Simply 
stated, this voting algorithm states that the cheaper it is to vote, the more likely it 
is  that someone will vote.  
However, what if the expected benefits of voting are less than the costs 
associated with the vote? This can be seen in New Zealand in the latest 2014 
election, where 22.1% of New Zealand did not vote. This is not to say that voting 
is too expensive in New Zealand to participate at any level, but rather, it 
demonstrates with specific figures that there is room for improvement. It is 
obvious that in a democratic system the more people who vote, the better it is for 
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the polity. Mueller and Stratmann outlined the relationship between voting and 
cost, contending that if fewer people vote, those that do will tend to be the 
wealthy.
 226
 With shortfalls in a lower income voting population, it is tautological 
to say that the median income of the voting population will rise. The expected 
behavioural response, then, will be lowered taxation of the upper income levels, 
and a widening (in the long term) of the income gap between the wealthy and less 
wealthy.  This dynamic is one way in which democracy can, in effect, support 
income inequality. This support is not a deliberate act of the voters, but rather, an 
effect of income inequality on overall voting behaviour, which in turn becomes an 
effect of voting behaviour on income inequality. 
Where Income Inequality Is Said to Have No Effect on Voter Turnout 
 
This argument suggests that the only effect income inequality can have on voting 
behaviour is concentrated within income groups themselves. The wealthy, it is 
thought, tend to participate more, and the less wealthy, to participate less, but the 
overall effect is that turnout does not change significantly.
227
 Scruggs and 
Stockemer asked the question (as regards  liberal democracies), as to ‗whether 
there is, in fact, any general connection between inequality and turnout‘.  The 
simple answer that they found was a definitive ‗no‘. Their study estimated that the 
effect of inequality would be negative, but their results showed that this was 
―substantively small and…far from statistical[ly] significan[t].‖228 
Voter turnout in NZ has declined significantly. Non-voters give a variety 
of excuses, including the desire ‗not to be bothered‘, although some cite the more 
compelling argument that their vote does not seem to count. Whatever the reason 
that non-voters cite, there is an intriguing circularity of the inequality dynamic.  
Inequality lowers the voter turnout of the lower income groups, resulting in 
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outcomes and then policies that favour the wealthy, eventually intensifying 
inequality, and then ultimately lowering even further the voter turnout of the 
lower income groups. This is perhaps the most compelling argument, if not 
explanation, of the decline of democracy in New Zealand.    
Hypotheses 
 
From the above literature, I have formulated three hypotheses that this paper will 
test: 
1. Household income inequality has a significant effect on party vote 
outcomes. 
2. Household income inequality has a significant impact on voter turnout at a 
national level. 
3. Unemployment levels have a significant impact on voter turnout. 
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Chapter Five: Research Methodology  
 
Using both an inferential and descriptive statistical approach, data for this project 
was collected from pre-existing statistical analysis, specifically taken from NZ 
statistics and electoral profiles. These data and data analyses were then contrasted 
and compared on linear graphs. I then paired these with analyses of existing 
studies in order to explain the outcomes of the graphs included at the end of this 
chapter. 
The objectives of my study were to: 
1. Identify if there had been changes in household income inequality and 
whether this inequality had resulted in changes in voter turnout on the 
national level between 2005 and 2014. 
2. Identify if there had been changes in household income inequality and 
whether inequality had a significant impact on voting preferences (party 
vote) between 2005 and 2014.  
3. Identify if there had been changes in employment levels, and if such 
changes had caused changes in national elections between 2005 and 2014. 
Quantitative Research Approaches  
 
Quantitative methods have been described as: 
emphasizing objective measurements and the statistical, mathematical, or 
numerical analysis of data collected through polls, questionnaires, and 
surveys, or by manipulating pre-existing statistical data 
using computational techniques. Quantitative research focuses on 
gathering numerical data and generalizing it across groups of people or to 
explain a particular phenomenon.
 229
 
Quantitative research methods use numerical data, including data gathered from 
surveys or other means by the researcher specifically for the project and/or data 
that has already been collected by various means. Such approaches can involve 
inferential statistical analysis (that is, analysis of a randomly drawn sample, and 
inferring the characteristics of the whole from that sample), or descriptive (that is, 
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using all of the data of some characteristic of a population, and using it to 
accurately describe that characteristic of that population). In general, data analysis 
is used to test a given hypothesis. Statistics must ultimately speak for themselves. 
My data was collected from pre-existing statistical data drawn from 
government sources (see Appendix 5), is largely descriptive, that is, represents 
complete numerical sets collected by government agencies, which I have then 
selected, visually arrayed, compared and contrasted, and is based upon my 
conceptual arguments.  It is arrayed in a range of tables and graphs.  
Materials and Data Used in this Study 
 
The materials that I selected for this study were: general electorate voting district 
profiles, household income before tax per voting districts, voter turnout in each 
district, employment data per voting district, and party votes per voting districts.  
General electorate voting districts: An electorate voting district is an area in 
New Zealand where votes are tallied for the local elections as one unit. The 
glossary from the Electorate Profile describes the electorates as
230
 
One of 64 geographic areas (periodically defined and named by the 
Representation Commission) which can be contested by candidates of any 
ethnicity, and who are enrolled on either the General or Māori Roll. Voters, 
who have to be on the General Roll, elect one electorate MP who must 
gain a plurality of the electorate votes cast in that electorate.  
 
My study also uses two Māori Electorates, which are described as: 
One of seven geographic areas (periodically defined and named by the 
Representation Commission) which can be contested by candidates of any 
ethnicity, and who are enrolled on either the General or Māori Roll. Voters, 
who have to be on the Māori Roll, elect one electorate MP who must gain 
a plurality of the electorate votes cast in that electorate.
231
 
Household income before tax: these data were collected from the Statistics NZ 
website, which originally collected the data from the New Zealand Census. This 
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data is broken down per voting district.
232
 A household is measured as one person, 
or two or more who reside together with shared facilities, such as a living area, 
kitchen or bathroom in a private dwelling. For the census used in my research 
(produced in the years of2001, 2006 and 2013), a household was counted as 
receiving income if one or more of the household members were over 15 years old. 
Households may have received income from more than one source, but each 
specific source is not defined: income includes combined sources, that is, wages, 
salaries and also other sources, such as benefits, interest payments, etc. Income 
figures given are before tax (gross) income.
233
 
Voter turnout: These data were collected from the Electorate Profile, 
which is published by the Parliamentary Library after a national election. Each 
profile contains a section on the electoral profile, the people, the households, and 
work data.  Voter turnout is referenced in the glossary as: 
 
 expressed as a percentage turnout is the total number of votes cast 
(including valid votes, disallowed votes, and informal votes) as a 
proportion of the number of electors enrolled on Election Day.
234
 
Employment data: These data were also collected from the Electorate Profile of 
the district in question. These data were collected from the Parliamentary Library 
from Statistics NZ who define unemployment as: 
the number of people unemployed expressed as a percentage of the labour 
force. The labour force consists of all individuals of the working-age 
population who are either employed or unemployed. Unemployment is 
defined as being without paid work, where a person was available for and 
actively seeking work.‖235 
Party votes: These percentages for the number of votes per party in each district 
were collected from the Electorate Profiles. This includes only the valid votes, not 
the total votes cast.   
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The NZ data were primary data and measured household income, the 
election turnout and voting preferences and was the most recent data for these 
measures. These current data enabled a contemporary analysis of household 
income inequality and voter turnout and preference. The texts I have analysed and 
used to draw my conclusions were chosen for their clarity and preoccupation with 
income and its correlative effects on voter participation.  
All the materials/data were entered into Microsoft Excel and formatted 
into tables using limited calculations. Household income before tax was measured 
in a p80/20 ratio to find if income inequality has risen or fallen. The data was then 
placed into a line graph from Microsoft Excel. 
The Research Protocol  
 
Income contributes to wellbeing. Material wellbeing provides a range of comforts 
to a household. Perry‘s report on Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in 
indictors of inequality and hardship 1982-2014, produced for the Ministry of 
Social Development, generated the diagram (below) to show the relationship 
between income, wealth and material wellbeing.  Based on this study, it is 
apparent that the higher these factors are, the more comfortable a household is. 
  
  
68 
Figure 4: The income-wealth-consumption-material wellbeing framework use 
in report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bryan Perry, Ministry of Social Development, Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indictors of 
inequality and hardship 1982-2014 (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2015) <https://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-
and-our-work/publications-resources/monitoring/household-incomes/1982-to-2014.html> [accessed 6 February 2017] (pp. 
32-33), p. 4.  Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #6. 
 
There are two categories of income: wealth and household income. Wealth tends 
to be something an individual will gather over time. For example, ownership of a 
house and a mortgage. Household income is an area which can rise and fall 
rapidly. This report examines the distribution of household income and household 
wealth.
236
 Older people, for example, may register as having high levels of wealth 
because of a mortgage-free home, but may have low-incomes because they are 
retired. Younger individuals may have higher incomes but lower levels of wealth 
in the absence of home ownership and other accumulated assets. Perry‘s study, 
then, examines both with a view to measuring a more intangible entity, economic 
wellbeing.   
The report, Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indicators of 
inequality and hardship 1982 to 2014, was also prepared by Bryan Perry as part 
of the ninth issue in the series of annual income reports. This was an attempt to 
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develop constructive policy in a difficult and highly political area.
237
 This report is 
close to my own study in that it considers elections up until the year 2014 on 
many of the same criteria, and also because it is Statistics NZ‘s leading research in 
the area of income inequality. I will therefore be using many of its data and 
conclusions in my own work. 
The income measure used in this report is ‗household after-tax cash 
income‘ measured over the period of a year (note that in my thesis income is 
measured before tax). This is referred to as disposable household income and is 
indicative of the access to economic resources and current living standards across 
New Zealand. All results are inferential estimates, and are based on the data from 
Statistics New Zealand‘s Household Economic Survey (HES). HES is a 
straightforward survey of around 2800-3600 private households. The data 
collected is primarily qualitative, and conducted by face-to-face interviews. The 
2013-2014 HES achieved a sample of 3400 participants.
238
 As noted above, I have 
rather chosen to measure income inequality using quantitative data, inferential and 
descriptive, available from government sources.   
A sample of approximately 3000 private households is used in each HES 
survey, and during the interview period each household member aged 15 and over 
keeps an expenditure diary for 14 consecutive days to recall any major purchases 
made that period. They also provide their income and employment data. The 
individual is also required to be living in a permanent dwelling.
239
 
To analyse income inequality more extensively, the report uses percentile 
ratios. This is where individuals are ranked on the equivalised income of their 
respective households and divided into 100 equal-sized groups or percentiles.  
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The percentile is measured as the relative distance between two points in the 
income distribution.  The report uses the following assumptions: 
 The P90/P10 ratio provides a good indication of the full spread of the 
distribution, going as far as possible to the extremes without running the 
risk of being overly influenced by unrepresentative very high incomes or 
by the difficulties with bottom decile incomes. 
 The P80/P20 ratio gives a better indication of the size of the range within 
which the majority of the population fall and has less volatility than the 
P90/P10 ratio. 
 The P80/P50 and the P20/P50 ratios give an indication of how higher and 
lower incomes compare with the midpoint.
 240
 
 
For the P90/P10, P80/P20 and P80/P50 indicators, the higher the ratio the greater 
is the level of inequality. For the P20/P50 indicator, the higher the ratio the lower 
is the level of inequality in this part of the distribution.   
The overall trend that we can establish from the graph below is that 
income inequality has been on the rise. What is important to note here is the 
significant change from 2005 to 2009. An election took place in 2008, and this 
was an important election because the gap had been  trending toward smaller 
numbers up until then. After this we see a spike, especially clear from 2010 to 
2012, and then a general climb upwards.  
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Table 4: BHC income inequality in New Zealand: percentile ratios, 1982 to 
2014, total population 
 
198
2 
198
6 
199
0 
199
4 
199
8 
200
1 
200
4 
200
7 
200
8 
200
9 
201
0 
2011 2012 
201
3 
201
4 
P90/
P10 
3.25 3.20 3.43 3.87 3.68 3.91 4.17 4.13 
4.01 
3.98 3.93 4.26 4.01 4.02 - 
P80/
P20 
2.32 2.19 2.42 2.52 2.59 2.68 2.74 2.59 
2.57 
2.55 2.56 2.67 2.61 2.62 2.78 
P80/
P50 
1.51 1.48 1.60 1.66 1.65 1.66 1.62 1.61 
1.61 
1.58 1.56 1.64 1.65 1.64 1.66 
P20/
P50 
0.65 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.62 
0.62 
0.63 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.60 
Source: Bryan Perry, Ministry of Social Development, Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indictors of 
inequality and hardship 1982-2014 (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2015) <https://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-
and-our-work/publications-resources/monitoring/household-incomes/1982-to-2014.html> [accessed 6 February 2017] (pp. 
32-33), p. 72.  Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #6. 
 
This study relates closely to my thesis. It is useful to examine New Zealand‘s 
most recent findings on income inequality, and to relate these to an understanding 
of where the statistics are trending. In my own study, I have used the P80/20 ratio 
because, as stated in the above report, this ratio gives a better indication of the 
significance of the change that is taking place. 
Only limited studies have been completed in New Zealand regarding the 
measurement of income inequality and its possible effects on voting. One such 
study, ‗Electoral turnout and income redistribution by the state: A cross-national 
analysis of the developed democracies‘, examined 13 developed democracies 
between 1979-2000. It concluded that in 1996, New Zealand‘s lowest income 
quintile had 85.8% voter turnout and the highest income quintile had 88.6%.
241
 It 
found that the rate of electoral turnout was positively related to the extent of 
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government redistribution.
242
 But, as seen in the previous chapter – voter turnout 
is in decline. 
There have been studies in New Zealand measuring income inequality as a 
causal variable, a problem in its own right. Max Rashbrooke‘s work, Inequality: A 
New Zealand Crisis, analyses this condition, but does not compare and contrast 
two critical and related variables, income inequality and voter turnout. Rashbrook 
does mention that the most comprehensive work on income inequality was 
produced by the Ministry of Social Development, ―Household incomes in New 
Zealand: Trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2014‖. This is 
used through out this thesis.  
How Measurements Were Made and Calculations Performed 
 
Eleven voting districts were chosen by stratified random sampling, by way of 
location and income. Hence, both inferential (as regards assumptions concerning 
New Zealand) and descriptive (as regards the characteristics of the districts 
themselves) techniques were employed.  Two higher income districts were used as 
controls, and two Māori voting districts were also selected in order to provide for 
a more complete ethnographic picture.  
To measure income inequality in each of the thirteen districts, I have used 
the P80/20 Ratio. This measure is the most commonly used to measure income 
inequality and is calculated by finding the bottom 20% (quintile) and top 80% 
(top four quintiles) of the household income data and placing them in their 
relevant groups to measure the distance in-between.
243
 The P80/20 or 20/20 ratio 
is used by the United Nations Development Programme, Human Development 
and Statistics NZ.  
I used the P80/20 to be consistent with New Zealand measures. I decided 
to measure household income inequality with voter turnout on line graphs (with 
Microsoft Excel) for a visual assessment. With a line graph I am able to compare 
continuous data sets, and given that my data is collected over a  relatively small 
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time period, and that there are no large disparities, a line graph is the conceptually 
clearest demonstration of my data.  
The difference between the bottom 20% and the top 80% is compared in 
2006, 2012 and 2015. The difference in income inequality was calculated as 
follows:  
 
To determine the location of the percentile: i.e., bottom 20% and top 80%, 
Using Christchurch East 2015: 
To find the top 80%, 0.80 x 14
244
 = 11.2 (round to nearest 10=11) 11.  
To find the bottom 20%, 0.20 x 14 = 2.8 (rounded to nearest 10= 3) 3. 
Then take the total numbers of individuals that form the three lowest 
income groups, (Nil-$10,000) which has a total individual count of; 84, 129, 132 
= 345 (value) 
Then take the total numbers of individuals from income groups 11 – 14 (4) 
($50,000 - $100,000+) of the highest income group; 1371, 1356, 3696, 3858 = 
10281 (value) 
To find the difference between the two values:
245
 
      
(     )  
   
 
 
 Using Christchurch East 2015: 
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= 
      
     
 
    
 
= 
    
    
 
= 1.87013 x 100 
= 187.013% difference
246
 
If the difference in each district has continued to increase, then we see that income 
inequality has increased for that district. I then entered the data into a graph, one 
graph per district and used a trend line to see if the differences were increasing or 
decreasing.  
These graphs display two separate measures, or variables:  e.g.,  
unemployment and voter turnout, voter turnout and income inequality, or income 
inequality and party vote. Both data series have a trend line. These results can be 
seen in figures 1-39. 
From the graphs, I have drawn on existing scholarship to analyse the 
relationships/trends. Existing scholarship helped to explain why the results read as 
they did, and enabled me to draw conclusions for New Zealand.  Existing studies 
explain that voting outcomes are not based on one independent variable, e.g., 
household income inequality is not the only reason an individual votes on election 
day—other reasons include, but are not limited to, education, age, accessibility to 
voting booths, etc.  
Validity and Reliability   
 
Internal/external validity: Every that hypothesis that I have tested in this thesis 
measures a single independent variable. My data was collected from reputable 
secondary sources, and there was no personal input to the data collection, that is, I 
did not personally collect data in the field.  
The method of measuring income inequality, using the p80/20 ratio, can 
be used on any data that has income groups,  e.g., if the data shows that 1625 
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people earned $10,000-$20,000. This data can then be entered against other socio-
economic variables and compared. Efforts were made to assure a modicum of 
validity through careful calculations and consist rounding of percentages 
according to the nearest 10 or 5. The methodology for calculating the difference in 
household incomes to measure inequality is outlined above. This data analysis 
approach can be used on other populations as well, and can be generalised for 
other countries. In fact, as long as the data is available, it can be placed on graphs 
and used to measure a range of other populations.  
I have examined thirteen electoral districts out of sixty-four, in four 
national elections. This is a small sample of the overall data that is available. 
While it is therefore difficult at best to use this study to generalise about New 
Zealand, it does seem possible to more fully understand the potential affects of 
household income inequality on voting. Furthermore, this study was restricted to 
one country. Using data from other countries would make for an interesting 
comparison and allow for the analysis of additional variables.  
Over the years 2005-2014 there were four national elections in New 
Zealand. Voting data was collected from the 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014 elections. 
Household income was collected from the New Zealand Census. The years of the 
national elections and the census data are not exactly aligned. The census results 
that I used were completed in 2001 (for the 2005 election), 2006 (for the 2008 and 
2011 elections), and 2013 (for the 2014 election). The 2011 census was cancelled 
because of a national state of emergency that had followed the Canterbury 
earthquake. This had an effect on my data collection.  There was an unbalanced 
increase in household income given the number of years without a census between 
the census of 2006 to and that of 2013.  
The electoral districts‘ household income measure proved to be a 
limitation as the cost of living in each district was not accounted for. Mt Albert 
has a higher average income, although the cost of living in Auckland is 
considerably higher than in New Plymouth. This is a limitation  
Another limitation is that employment rates are measured from the age of 
fifteen, whereas voter turnout is only measured from the age of eighteen. This has 
the effect of skewing the findings. Yet another limitation is the periodic changing 
of electoral boundaries. For the 2014 selection there were boundary changes to 
eight of the 13 electoral districts. Those that were not changed were; Northland, 
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Taupō, Palmerston North, Nelson and Invercargill. Most districts only had minor 
changes, although this does effect the overall statistical analysis.
247
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Chapter Six: Results  
 
This chapter presents data from 13 voting districts over a period from 2005 to 
2014. Three sections address the questions this study has raised. The first of these,  
‗does income inequality have a significant effect on the turnout in nationwide 
voting?' is the primary research question. Three districts are of central interest. 
The outcome of the analysis suggests that HII has a significant inverse effect on 
voter turnout. With income inequality increasing, over time there was a decrease 
in voting rates. The second question, ‗does household income inequality have a 
significant effect on party outcomes?' provided the basis for five graphs that 
demonstrate that raising HII tends to result in right-of-centre voting tendencies. 
The final question, ‗does unemployment have a significant effect on voter 
turnout?' provides the basis for two graphs, one that suggests that when 
employment levels are high, voter turnout tends to be low, and the other, that 
when unemployment levels are high, voter turnout tends to be high as well. The 
chapter then concludes with an overall analysis of the results and the limitations 
of the data.   
Hypothesis 1: Does income inequality have a significant effect on turnout in 
nationwide voting?  
 
To test this hypothesis, I measured HII against voting turnout for national elections 
within each of the key districts selected. The districts were: Mt Albert, Napier, 
and Waiariki. 2011 proved to be a year where all districts experienced a drop in 
voter turnout. The reasons for this (the greatest decline since 1887) are briefly 
mentioned in Chapter 2.  
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Figure 4: Income Inequality and Voter Turnout in Mt Albert  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Mt Albert Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
In 2005, Mt Albert had a significant disparity between voter turnout and HII. Over 
time in this district, the two variables have slowly come together, with overlap 
occurring just before 2014. This overlap has led to a meeting point in 2014. From 
2005 to 2011, it would seem that the 2005 election was accompanied by a higher 
voter turnout, and although overall voter turnout actually decreased, it was only 
by 0.3%. Between 2011 and 2014,  HII and voter turnout both had similar steep 
climbs. 2014 saw an increase in voter turnout by 5%, 2008 and 2014 saw an 80% 
voter turnout rate. Without the 2011 election, the voter turnout for this district 
would have been fairly consistent. Mt. Albert demonstrates that HII appeared to 
have had little effect on this district, with voter turnout rates of 80.30%, 80%, and 
80%, essentially no change despite HII increasing. Taupō and Northland displayed 
similar patterns.  If the 2011 voter turnout rates were not included in this study, 
the districts would have had relatively consistent voter turnout rates with those of 
Taupō, an average of 80.1% (80.20%, 80%, 79%), and with those of Northland, 
an average of 80.5% (81.5, 80, 80). These voter turnout rates, incidentally, are 
higher than that of the OECD average of 70%. Palmerston North might also be 
said to fit in this category, although it has experienced a more rapid decline in 
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turnout. From 2005 to 2014, Palmerston North's voter turnout has fallen from 82.4% 
to 80%. The above districts have reinforced the argument that HII does not 
significantly affect voter turnout, although Palmerston North suggests that there is 
some insignificant influence.  
These results can be compared and contrasted with other studies that 
suggest that HII has little or no effect on voter turnout. Scruggs and Stockmer, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, explain that income inequality only changes which 
income groups choose to vote. As income inequality increases, the rich vote more 
and the less wealthy vote less, but the overall turnout numbers do not differ 
significantly. 
 
Figure 5: Income Inequality and Voter Turnout in Napier 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Napier Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
For the Napier District, 2005 saw HII and voter turnout relatively close, and these 
have continued to trend downwards together over the last four elections. Voter 
turnout has been on the decline more significantly than the districts mentioned 
above. Napier‘s results show a drop (-4.2%) from 81.2% in 2005 to 77% turnout 
in 2014. Districts similar to Napier in the extent of decline are Hamilton East, 
with a 5% decline in voter turnout, and Wellington Central, with a 1.6% decline. 
In these districts, as voter turnout declines, HII also declines. These three districts, 
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then, provide a case against both traditional studies in the field, as well as 
countering the graph above. 
The Relative Power Theory suggests that income inequality will tend to 
depress voting turnout.
248
  As the bridge between the rich and the poor lessens, 
competition becomes less, and the motivation to vote drops. Jamie Castillo posits 
that when the interests of the poor are not represented in government, the poor 
will tend not to vote, and in turn, the rich will also withdraw to some extent from 
voting.
249
 Lower levels of HII produce less need for redistribution, and therefore, 
less reason for the poor to vote. Without the poor voting, there is less need for the 
wealthy to protect their interests, and this results in the wealthy withdrawing to 
some extent from voting as well.  
 
Figure 6: Income Inequality and Voter Turnout in Nelson  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Nelson Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
Nelson‘s trend lines provide an almost perfect ‗X'. This begins with HII rising and 
voter turnout high. As discussed in Chapter Four,  because of inequalities, people 
are encouraged to vote to have their interests represented in government. As 
suggested by conflict theory, as discussed in Chapter Four, the frustration between 
the different income groups is what motivates individuals to vote. One motivation 
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of poor citizens lies with wanting stronger redistributive policies; for the wealthy 
citizens, it tends to be a desire for lower taxes.  
A significant change in 2009-2010 was noted as regarded voter turnout. As 
voter turnout dropped, HII continued to rise. These results reinforced the Relative 
Power Theory, also discussed in Chapter Four. Poorer citizens apparently refrain 
from politics when they believe that their voice will not influence change.
250
 The 
individual's motivation ultimately reverts back to his or her economic situation, 
according to this theory, when that situation appears to be bleak, and that 
individual simply assumes that he or she simply deserves nothing better.
251
 Solt‘s 
studies in 2010 and 2008 argued that income inequality has an inverse impact on 
voting.
252
 He contends that high-income inequalities lead to low political 
participation rates.
253
 Higher polarisation among the political parties makes it 
more difficult to form coalitions.  As we have seen in New Zealand, there has not 
been a formal coalition government since 2005. When this happens, Jamie-
Castillo argues, that the rich are more likely to vote, , although overall turnout will 
still tend to be low because the high-income voters will know that the interests of 
the lower classes will not succeed in forming a government.
254
 This situation is 
expressed outlined in a paper by Jack Vowels on the 2011 election, where the 
parties chose not to cooperate formally.  This anti-coalition behaviour is likewise 
thought to lower voter turnout.
255
 Taking into account statistics from the Social 
Report, 7.1% did not vote because they did not think their vote would make a 
difference. The Relative Power Theory has appeared tended to offer the most 
cogent explanation of the elections of 2011 and 2014. This is especially true for 
Christchurch East, Invercargill, New Plymouth, Waiariki and Ikaroa-Rāwhiti.  
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Conclusion for voter turnout 
 
The data from the 13 voting districts has tended to reinforce the argument that HII 
has a significant adverse effect on voter turnout. 30.76% of the districts have 
demonstrated that regardless of an increase in HII, there has been little effect on 
voter turnout. As regards the largest group of the districts, in 46.15% HII appeared 
to have encouraged voting, although over the period studied, an increase in HII 
seems to have led to lower voter turnout. In 23.07% of the districts, when HII 
decreased, voter turnout continued to decline. These results are significant in the 
sense that when HII is higher, there tends to be greater motivation for voting, 
although in the long term this may lead to some withdrawal from voting. The 
Relative Power Theory provides that this withdrawal can be explained by 
individual psychology: if an individual believes that his or her vote will not make 
a difference, he or she will tend not to vote. This is consistent with the results 
from The Social Report: 7.1% of New Zealanders who did not vote attributed their 
behaviour to their belief that their vote would not be heard. With the separation 
between income groups that income inequality breeds, it might be argued that 
there would be motivation to vote to achieve more redistributive policies and 
government intervention on behalf or specific groups. The data from this study 
has found the opposite, that income inequality tends to discourage voting. 
Hypothesis 1a: Does income inequality have a significant effect on party 
outcomes? 
 
This question has two elements. The first consists of a measure of right- and left-
of-centre voting. The second element involves the relationship of HII and political 
party identities and policies in the 13 districts.   
By way of analysis, I have grouped all parties according to conservative or 
liberal leanings. To categorise the parties, I relied on Votecompass, which is 
funded by Vox Pop Labs, TVNZ, the Electoral Commission, the University of 
Auckland, and Victoria University of Wellington. Their political categorization is 
based on the 2014 election. I have used categories for all of the election years 
because it can be contended that the parties have not changed ideologically very 
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much during this ten year period.  I then found the percentage support for each 
party and placed it in the appropriate category. Below is a chart documenting the 
electoral party positions as of 2014. 
256
 
 
Table 5: Categories of New Zealand Political Parties  
Right-of-Centre (Conservative) Left-of-Centre(Liberal) 
National Labour 
United Future Green 
Conservatives (2011) Mana (2011) 
ACT Internet Party (2014) 
 New Zealand First 
 
 2005 – 15% of districts voted for conservative parties  
 2008 – 46% of districts voted for conservative parties 
 2011 – 53% of districts voted for conservative parties 
 2014 – 53% of districts voted for conservative parties 
 
As displayed above, the support for the conservative parties has increased over the 
past four elections. The studies covered in Chapter Three argue that income 
inequality has an inverse relationship with voter turnout, and that the higher 
income earners are more likely to vote when inequality is high.
257
 Higher voter 
turnout by the wealthy would tend to lead to right-of-centre policies according to 
the studies cited in Chapter Three.  From the results of left- and right-of-centre 
voting, it can be inferred that either more of the wealthy are voting or people are 
voting against their interests.  Income inequality is high, and we have a tendency 
to push out the lower income group, preventing them from voting while 
encouraging the higher income groups to vote, and in turn, this has lead to more 
conservative, or right-of-centre, voting patterns.  
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Taking this data a step further, I have examined patterns in contrasting 
districts in an attempt to establish if there has been a significant change in HII, and 
whether HII exercises an effect on the outcome as regards  particular parties.  I 
noticed that parties that offered a higher level of redistribution did not appear to 
receive significant levels of votes from the public. From the districts this project 
surveyed, certain low-income groups  tended to vote for Labour (a party that 
supports income redistribution more than does the National Party), and this was 
the case in Ikaroa-Rāwhiti, Waiariki and arguably Christchurch East. However, in 
a majority of the districts that have a predominance of low-income voters 
compared to the New Zealand average, the National Party tended to predominate, 
as in Hamilton East, Napier, Invercargill, Northland, and New Plymouth. 
 
Figure 7: Income inequality and Party Outcome for Christchurch East  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Christchurch East Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New 
Zealand Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 
February 2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Christchurch East, from 2005 to 2011, saw a steady climb in HII. Christchurch 
East had strong Labour support in 2005, with 53.44% of the vote, while National 
had 27.86%. In 2008, Labour gained 45.27% of the vote, and National had 35.7%. 
2011 saw National take over the majority.  Looking more closely at the years 
2005 and 2011, HII was already on the rise for National. In 2005, the difference of 
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HII was 183%, while it was 188% in 2011. It was during these years that there was 
an increase in HII and a rise in support for the National party. Andre Freire's 
research, covered in Chapter Three, found that citizens who supported more 
income equality tended to vote more to the  left-of-centre.
258
 Theoretically, 
according to studies that do not employ  this thesis, it can be argued that if HII is 
on the rise, the poor should be voting left-of-centre, that is, in favour of a party 
that places a higher value on redistribution. Such party preferences suggest that 
citizens are voting against their own immediate interests, as supported by the 
results from 2011 to 2014. When HII lowers, so does the vote for National. Frank 
Thomas suggests that the groups that might be predicted to vote left-of-centre are 
abandoning their beliefs in frustration.
259
   As noted in Chapter Two, Ansell and 
Samuels questioned the reasons that motivate poor to vote against greater 
redistribution.
260
 Several such reasons have been presented throughout this study. 
First, people generally think that get what they deserve, and are reluctant to ask 
for handouts. This coincides with reluctance to ‗blame' government for one‘s 
position. An individual may also believe that although he or she is poor at the 
present time, this may not last, and, in fact, he or she, may be rich in the future, 
thus causing some reluctance to vote for redistribution policies. It could also be 
the case that the argument posed by Acterberg and Houtman is operative, that the 
poor are in competition with each other for work or even life in general, and that 
this creates a motivation to vote for right-of-centre parties.
261
 It could also be that 
HII is increasing, but that the population that it is affecting the most are 
preoccupied with financial struggles and do not consider politics a priority, or do 
not have sufficient resources to be concerned with politics.  
Northland, New Plymouth, Mt Albert, Nelson, Palmerston North, and 
Taupō are similarly trending toward lower income districts, and yet voting 
consistently for political parties whose primary concerns do not align with their 
own. Another aspect to take into consideration is the overall rise in HII, and the 
increase in party vote for the Green Party. The votes for the Green Party 
continually increased, but not at a rate similar to that of the HII. This relationship 
between the growth of the Green Party votes and growth in HII would be 
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considered to be stronger if the HII growth were more pronounced. Similar 
districts have had Labour in the lead and then, over the same time period, saw a 
change to a predominance of National Party voting.  These include Mt Albert, 
Nelson, and Palmerston North. 
 
Figure 8: Income Inequality and Party Outcome for Invercargill  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Invercargill Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
The Invercargill voting district displayed a pattern unlike any of the other districts.  
The HII remained stable.  In 2005, HII produced a difference at 185%; this was on 
a par with most of the other districts. However, unlike the other districts, it then 
declined to 169% between 2008 to 2011, and then went up to 188% in 2014. The 
party vote outcome in 2005 was a close between Labour and National. Over the 
next three elections, the difference between Labour and National grew, with 
National leading. The party vote outcomes are similar in Christchurch East, but 
interestingly, the HII data is not.  This suggests that perhaps, HII was not 
significantly influencing party vote outcomes. Regardless of HII, the vote for the 
right-of-centre was gaining momentum over these election years.  
Before that conclusion can be drawn definitively, however, the two minor 
parties, the Green Party and New Zealand First, have to be factored into the 
equation. They have had interesting outcomes, and tend to support claims that HII 
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is, in fact, a determinant of the party vote. When HII was high in 2005, New 
Zealand First received more votes than The Green Party. When HII was low from 
2008-2011, the opposite occurred, with the Green Party receiving more votes. 
When HII hit a high again in 2014, the New Zealand First party received more 
votes. It should be noted that these two parties stand in opposition to each other 
ideologically, as right-of-centre and left-of-centre parties, respectively. The right-
of-centre party received more votes when HII was high, and the left-of-centre 
party received more votes when HII was lower. This highlights the concept that 
individuals tend to vote against their immediate economic interests. With these 
minor parties producing a similar outcome to the Christchurch East voting district, 
HII underlines the fact that voters are leaning toward moral reasoning rather than 
immediate economic interests when casting votes.   Voters are apparently also 
drawn emotionally to the political status quo, which favoured a National party 
majority.    
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Figure 9: Income inequality and Party Outcome for Wellington Central  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Wellington Central Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New 
Zealand Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 
February 2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Wellington Central has had a decrease in HII. In 2005, HII in Wellington Central 
was one of the highest found in the districts chosen for this study,  at 194%. At 
this time, Labour had a strong vote in Wellington Central. HII hit a low in 2008-
2011 at 188% and started to climb again in 2014, reaching 191%. As the graph 
shows, HII then turned downwards, but the vote for National and the Green Party 
remained almost symmetric. The vote for the Green Party, meanwhile, was steady. 
Meltzer and Richard predicted that people with income below the medium would 
vote left-of-centre.
262
  Wellington Central, one of the highest earning districts (the 
average household income in 2013 was $109,500, much higher than the Northland 
district, which had an average of $79,200) is the exception to the Meltzer and 
Richard model; there is a noticeable vote for the left-of-centre. Chapter Three 
notes that in Portugal, citizens who favoured lower HII and more state intervention 
were more likely to vote left-of-centre.
263
 This is an opposite trend to that 
which we see in the majority of the districts in  New Zealand. As HII 
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increased by 2014, the difference between votes for National and The Green Party 
decreased. In 2001, this gap was 10.73%, and by 2014, the gap was 8.04%. These 
results indicate that when a district has a significant difference in HII, the public 
notices the income difference, and exercise their voting rights in favour of a left-
of-centre party, ostensibly to counteract the trend and to support a party with 
redistributive policies. Although this district saw a decline in HII, then, there was 
an increase in votes for the left, suggesting that once a district reaches a certain 
level of HII difference (Wellington Central's 2014 HII difference was 191% 
compared to all the districts average of 181%), the public tends to react, 
displaying their disagreement through the means of voting for a left-of-centre 
party. 
Mt Albert is also one of the districts that has seen more support for a left-
of-centre party. This district also experienced an increase in HII. It may be similar 
to Wellington Central in that it is a higher earning district and the public is may 
have begun to disagree with the situation regarding the HII (Mt Albert's 2014 HII 
difference was 184%, compared to the average of 181%).  Mt Albert and 
Wellington are the only districts that agree with the studies cited (when HII 
increases, there is an increase in voting to the left, ostensibly for a greater focus 
on redistributive policies). 
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Figure 10: Income Inequality and Party Outcome for Ikaroa-Rāwhiti 
 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Ikaroa-Rāwhiti Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
HII grew in this district, with a substantial increase from 2005 to 2008/2011, but 
then dropped in 2014. This district had a strong vote for left-of-centre parties and 
has always been a strong supporter of Labour. Interestingly, however, the vote for 
Labour and the Māori Party both decreased. This district was difficult to measure 
because the vote for the Mana Party increased as the party became more 
established. Furthermore, this district gave considerable support to the New 
Zealand First Party, ideologically almost the complete opposite to Labour and the 
Māori Party.  It is curious that New Zealand First received the significant number 
of votes that it did.  It could be that the decline in this district of HII in 2014 led 
the district to consider more right-of-centre politics, even though it has been a 
solidly left-of-centre district. This is reminiscent of the arguments raised in the 
book, What's the matter with Kanas, as regards voters who cast their votes against 
their own immediate economic interests.
264
 The rise of HII coincided with a trend 
towards right-of-centre party voting. It is also possible, however, that votes from 
Labour and the Māori Party were moved to the Mana Party, a decidedly left-of-
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centre party. Wairarikai is a district comparable to Ikaroa - Rauwhiti which 
appeared to be following a similar voting trajectory.   
Figure 11: Income Inequality and Party Outcome for Hamilton East  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Hamilton East Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Hamilton East showed a decrease in HII. In 2005, HII was at its highest level for 
this district out of the election years covered. When HII was greater, there was a 
higher vote for Labour, and also for United Future. This sits comfortably with 
Meltzer and Richard's prediction that people with income below the average will 
vote more left-of-centre parties. to reap  the benefits of redistributive policies.
265
 
At the time that HII was high, redistribution policies may have been more 
pervasive. Ana L. De La O states that ‗poor masses in unequal societies should 
vote for parties of the left that promise confiscatory levels of taxation and 
redistribution‘.266 This district shows just that. A higher level of left-of-centre 
voting when HII is high. Analysing Freire's ‗Cleavages, Values and the Vote in 
Portugal, 2005-09', the citizens who favoured an equal income distribution were 
more likely to vote left-of-centre.
267
 Over the elections in New Zealand, HII 
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declined as did the vote for Labour. It seems that as HII was less apparent, and the 
vote for the left-of-centre also struggled. The Green Party support developed, 
which perhaps indicates that a minority of the population were seeing HII as a 
social issue, although perhaps not yet one of national interest. Since this district 
saw a decline in HII, a vote for the right-of-centre was perhaps covering all 
individual interests, and individuals might have felt fairly content with where HII 
was been sitting, even if it was trending downwards. Napier was a district that 
also saw similar trends with nearly all parties showing a similar pattern. 
Conclusion: Party Vote  
 
These results suggest that HII has a significant effect on New Zealanders as 
regards their voting preferences.  Specifically, it tends to encourage them to vote 
against their immediate economic interests. They have tended to vote 
(inappropriately) for right-of-centre parties when their own objective interests 
would appear to favour redistributive policies.  Most electoral districts have 
displayed an increase in HII. New Zealand, in fact, has manifested a similar 
pattern in this regard to that of Kansas in the 1980s and 1990s, as described in 
Thomas Frank‘s work,268 and has similarly adopted a stubborn refusal by its less 
wealthy voters to support their own immediate economic interests by voting for 
redistributive policies and left-of-centre political parties.   Where left-of-centre 
voting was once common among the less wealthy, increasingly, even as the less 
wealthy group is increasing, voting is favouring the right-of-centre.  Does this 
represent a lack of faith in New Zealand's political system?  Is it becoming 
apparent that the less wealthy see themselves as eventually becoming wealthy 
themselves, and are therefore voting in their future interests? These results have 
highlighted contrasting possible explanations, and have opened the door to further 
analysis. 
Hypothesis 1b: Does unemployment have a significant effect on voter turnout?  
 
Extending the studies cited in Chapter Two on unemployment and voter turnout, 
there are several contrasting conclusions, or hypotheses, that might be offered:  
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employment increases voter turnout; unemployment increases voter turnout; 
employment status does not affect voter turnout.  
From the districts studied, two conditions have been duly noted:  
employment can and often does decrease voter turnout. This situation has 
occurred in 76.92% of the districts. The second is that unemployment can and 
does increase voter turnout.  
 
Figure 12: Unemployment rate and Voter Turnout in Waiariki  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Waiariki Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
In 2005, the Waiariki voting district showed a close relationship between voter 
turnout and unemployment. As the elections continued, a formerly small gap 
between the variables widened, while both variables continued to decrease. With 
greater levels of employment, there was a decrease in voter turnout. Again, citing 
from Chapter Two, it was difficult to find studies in this area, although there were 
stronger claims that employment tends to encourage voting. As regards this 
district, as well as other districts such as Napier, Nelson, Christchurch East, 
Hamilton East, New Plymouth, Palmerton North, Wellington Central, Ikaroa-
Rāwhiti, and Invercargill, there is a good deal of support for this argument that 
increasing  employment encourages voter turnout. 
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Charles and Stephen's research, however, found that rising employment 
levels may actually reduce voter turnout if exposure to political information 
increases the individual's uncertainty regarding the nature and likely outcome of 
an election. It may, in this sense, lower voter turnout.
269
 This research seems to 
have been valid only at a local level, however. Presidential elections provided 
greater exposure, and thus rendered employment irrelevant as a causal variable. It 
could be that in New Zealand this observation is valid regarding our national 
elections, at least in most of the districts studied.  Data suggests, at any rate, that 
higher employment levels are associated with lower voter turnout.  
Adequate employment and workplace enjoyment may produce little 
motivation for voting. As discussed above, being exposed to discrimination at 
work or witnessing a situation wherein someone is made uncomfortable in the 
work place may in some cases encourage someone to vote in the interests of 
changing the system. On the other hand, enjoyment in the workplace, or 
satisfaction with employment, might well discourage voting, at least voting to 
change the system.    
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Figure 13: Unemployment and Voter Turnout in Taupō 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Taupō Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Taupō, Mt Albert and Northland between 2005 and 2011 seemed to indicate that 
when unemployment is high, so is voter turnout. In 2014, employment seemed to 
be ‗causing‘ lower voter turnout. However, the two elections, 2005 and 2008, 
clarify the changes that happened in the election in 2014.  
Lipset's argument, outlined in Chapter Two, stated that ―groups subject to 
economic pressures with which groups cannot cope, such as inflation, depression, 
monopolistic exploitation, or structural changes in the economy, might also be 
expected to turn to government action as a solution and to show high voting 
average‖.270  It is in these times that the individual may be voting to gain 
governments support, whether that be through redistributive policies or the 
creation of new jobs, the individual is depending upon government to help him or 
her, and probably – as research has suggested -  blames the government for social 
hardship. This blame acts as a triggering mechanism, causing individuals to vote, 
especially when unemployment levels are high. This arguably happened in 2005-
2008, and this trend continued in 2014 – although with less unemployment –the 
government was no longer blamed, and thus the individual motivation to vote for 
left-of-centre parties and redistributive policies was gone.    
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Times of economic hardship caused by unemployment, then, can be seen 
to function as motivation to vote, and to vote in specific patterns. Taupō 
demonstrated this causal relation clearly when unemployment was high.  A great 
many citizens turned out to vote, and voted for redistributive policies and parties.  
When unemployment decreased, voter turnout declined. The graph suggests that 
there is a balance between lower unemployment and lower participation in voting. 
When there are more jobs, there is lower voter turnout and less motivation to vote. 
Conclusion: Unemployment and Voter Turnout 
 
Of the 13 districts studied, a majority displayed that when employment was high, 
voter turnout was low. With the three districts that did not support this finding, 
Taupō, Mt Albert and Northland, high unemployment was accompanied by high 
voter turnout. Most of the studies cited in this thesis agree that when 
unemployment is high, individuals will tend to seek government intervention, and 
this creates or accompanies the motivation to vote.  As unemployment lessens, 
voter turnout tends to drop. It New Zealand, voters apparently blame the 
government for the lack of employment, and are thereby motivated to vote.  In the 
past, when they voted in this way, they tended to receive jobs, or the economy 
grew, providing jobs, and they thereby settled their primary grievance, eventually 
and subsequently deciding that voting was no longer necessary, so that by the 
2011 and 2014 elections voter turnout dropped. A majority of the districts already 
seemed to be at this point in 2005, with 10 out of 13 manifesting high 
employment and lower voter turnout.  As employment levels have been rising, 
voter turnout has continued to drop. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has used empirical data to analyse the theoretical arguments in 
Chapters Two with reference to 13 electoral districts in New Zealand over a 
decade and four national elections. The findings support the view that HII has an 
inverse effect on voter turnout, taken as a whole. This lower voter turnout among 
less wealthy citizens is the result of not believing that their vote would make a 
difference. From the voting that is occurring, there appears to be a clear 
preference for right-of-centre parties. The gap in HII is becoming larger in a 
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majority of the districts, and with the vote trending towards right-of-centre parties 
ion most districts, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that citizens are increasingly 
voting against their immediate economic interests. While employment has been 
increasing over the period that this study examines, and voter turnout is 
decreasing, this confusing trend may only be showing that New Zealanders have 
blamed the government for the lack of good jobs in early 2005, had the motivation 
to vote, received a job (of some sort) and thereby seemingly lost the bases (or 
most of the bases) of their grievances with the government. Although New 
Zealand has a high employment rate, HII is rising, as are lower voter turnout rates, 
which are pushing individuals who do vote to vote against their immediate 
economic interests. This research is admittedly limited, having only examined 13 
districts out of a possible 64. My findings in this chapter could not hope to 
uncover the overall patterns in New Zealand, nor could it explain declining voter 
turnout across the entire country.  However, what these results do seem to say is 
that voter turnout is affected by many different variables, and that there is the 
potential for household income inequality to influence individuals very directly, 
and very personally, in their decision as to whether or not to vote. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
This thesis has examined income inequality and unemployment as potential causal 
variables in an attempt to understand why voter turnout has been declining in New 
Zealand. These variables were used in a longitudinal analysis from 2005 to 2014 
with 13 comparative and contrasting local electoral districts in New Zealand, a 
country once regarded as one of the most egalitarian societies in the world,
271
 and 
ranked only 23
rd 
out of 34 countries on the OECD measure of income inequality 
in 2012.  Sadly, it has continued to drop since then, with "New Zealand [having] 
the largest increase in income inequality of all the OECD countries since the mid-
1980's…".272   
Of particular relevance to this study, of the top 20% of income earners in 
New Zealand over the period studied, 86% voted in the NZ national elections, 
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compared to the bottom 20% of income earners, where only 75% voted.
273
 When 
New Zealander‘s were asked why they did not vote, the General Social Survey 
found that 28% of individuals who did not vote also did not feel they had enough 
money to meet everyday needs, compared with only 12% who responded that they 
had enough money but nevertheless chose not to vote.
274
 New Zealand‘s uniquely 
rapid growth in income inequality follows a long history of unparalleled income 
equality, and therefore represents a striking and traumatic societal change. This 
pattern developed after the 1980's, and a pervasive series of economic reforms 
initiated by a Labour Party government after the collapse of the country‘s close 
post-colonial economic ties with the UK.
275
 After nearly a decade of consequent 
political struggles, there was support for a change to the political system, and this 
soon emphasised voting procedures. The change from FPP to MMP was a 
reflection of the changes New Zealand experienced and the growth of inequality. 
The nation was in a period of struggle, and this was accompanied by 
disillusionment and disengagement. This thesis has examined the causes of this 
disengagement in voting behaviour, with special attention to income inequality 
and unemployment as potential causal variables. I sought to explain documented 
voting disengagement in New Zealand over the past decade by exploring three 
relevant questions and testing three related hypotheses: 
 
Hypotheses 1: When household income inequality has risen, voter turnout at 
national elections has dropped. 
Hypothesis 1a: When household income inequality rises, the National Party 
receives more votes on the national level. 
Hypothesis 1b: When unemployment rises, the rate of voter turnout increases. 
This chapter concludes with the results of the three hypotheses: 
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Hypotheses 1: When Household Income Inequality has risen, Voter Turnout 
at National Elections has Dropped 
 
Throughout my research on 13 voting districts, I found that HII does appear to 
have a significant effect on voter turnout. 46.15% of the districts seemed to show 
that high levels of HII encouraged voting, although over a period of four to eight 
years of continuing rises in HII, this effect declined, as did voter turnout. This led 
to the conclusion that HII has a significant inverse effect on voter turnout. In other 
words, poor citizens will refrain from voting, assuming that their voices will have 
little influence. A comparison of these findings with those of the General Social 
Survey, which reveal that 7.1% of New Zealanders did not vote in the 2008 and 
2011 elections, apparently because they did not think their votes would make a 
difference,
276
 and 28% of New Zealanders apparently did not have enough money 
to make ends meet, my findings, then, can be recast to fit a relatively 
straightforward argument: participation in politics is more likely to be driven by 
relative income.  This is supported by the Relative Power theory,
277
 and, as well, 
by Solt‘s study,278 which produced a trend line that demonstrated that inequality 
will tend to have an inverse relationship with voter turnout except as regards 
higher income earners, who tend to vote in greater frequencies as inequality rises, 
ostensibly to protect their interests. This trend was evident in a majority of the 
districts in New Zealand.  Again, simply stated, as income inequality grew, a vote 
for right-of-centre political parties became more apparent.   
Hypothesis 1a: When Household Income Inequality Rises, the National Party 
receives more National Level 
 
With an increase in income inequality, given Solt‘s study demonstrating that the 
wealthy are more likely to vote under these circumstances,
279
 there is a higher 
likelihood that right-of-centre (that is, anti-redistributive) political parties will 
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benefit electorally.   One of the less wealthy districts, Ikaroa-Rāwhiti, in 2014 had 
a 66% voter turnout rate compared with the most wealthy district, Wellington 
Central, which had an 85% voter turnout. These results point to a decline in voter 
turnout in the less wealthy districts, with an increase in voting among the wealthy, 
and thus a significant increase in voting for right-of-centre political parties.  In 
2005, 15% of the districts voted in the majority for a right-of-centre party; by 
2014, 53% of the districts had voted in the majority for a right-of-centre party. It 
is apparent, based on our data, that citizens who prefer right-of-centre political 
parties tend to have higher incomes and are more likely to vote. This pattern is 
reinforced in our results,  with some minor exceptions in the two wealthiest 
districts, which, although voting a right-of-centre party into government, also had 
a higher vote for the left-of-centre parties then the districts of average income. 
This thesis did not use income as a variable, but rather HII, the 
contradicting theory to the above, that is, that citizens are in effect frequently 
voting against their immediate economic interests, e.g., the less wealthy tend to 
vote for right-of-centre (anti-redistributive) parties. This observation is supported 
in the higher earning districts as well, where there was a substantial vote for left-
of-centre (pro-redistributive) parties compared to the lower income districts. It 
could be that Wellington and Mt Albert are districts that tend to favour left-of-
centre parties because income inequality is higher than average, and citizens there 
want a change. In the Meltzer and Richard model, in which the less wealthy are 
expected to vote for left-of-centre parties, Wellington Central and Mt Albert 
might be expected to see a change in the the near future. At any rate, income 
inequality has led to lower voter turnout in New Zealand in the recent past, and to 
support for right-of-centre parties.   In any event, the Meltzer and Richard study 
speculated that ―If fewer people vote, then relatively more rich people vote, so 
median voter income will be larger, which decreases taxes (meaning lower 
redistribution)‖.280  A further response to answer question 1a, then, will simply 
require additional research into income and education levels. I have attempted to 
show that with an increase in HII, support for right-of-centre parties rises, although 
this conclusion is difficult to affirm without additional (and more specific) data 
involving income and education as variables.  
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Hypothesis 1b: When Unemployment Rises, the Rate of Voter Turnout 
Increases 
 
The findings from Hypothesis 1b supported the null hypothesis. It seems that 
when employment is rises, voter turnout declines. I found that as unemployment 
in the districts in New Zealand that I examined decreased, so did voter turnout. 
Only 23.07% of the 13 districts supported the hypothesis that when there was 
higher unemployment, there was higher voter turnout. The New Zealand General 
Social Survey found that 35.2% of unemployed people did not vote, as compared 
with 17.8% of those in the labour force who did not vote.
281
 Rosenstone found 
that those who are unemployed tend to be worried about immediate life 
necessities, and voting is seldom a priority.
282
 
Unemployment is often said to be paired with a breakdown in 
relationships with co-workers and friends, and in turn tends to cut off political 
dialogue and engagement. As Rosenstone wrote, "when a person experiences 
economic adversity his scarce resources are spent on holding body and soul 
together – surviving – not on remote concerns like politics".283 Another concern 
involving the unemployed has to do with an emotional issue: blame.  Is it 
attributed to shortcomings in the individual him or herself?   Is it something that 
must be resolved individually? Is it attributed to the government, and can voting 
be used as a way to address the resultant frustration? Aytac, Rau, and Stokes 
found that the longer an individual is unemployed, the more likely he or she is to 
blame the government for the unemployment.
284
 H1b displayed a pattern that 
seems to attribute blame to the government, and thus explains higher voter turnout. 
The trend that the data reinforced was that when employment was high, voter 
turnout was low. Throughout the districts over the election years when 
unemployment was high, voter turnout was high, when unemployment declined, 
voter turnout declined as well. Individuals apparently sought out government 
intervention, and when this was received, satisfactorily or not, voter turnout 
declined.  
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Implications of Declining Voter Turnout 
 
A view of all of the data of this thesis taken as a whole points to a causal link 
between the three major variables. When income inequality and employment 
levels are high, there tends to be a decline in voter turnout, and greater electoral 
support for right-of-centre (anti-redistributive) political parties.  There are at least 
two major inferences that can be drawn from the decline in voter turnout. One is 
that lower personal incomes may signal a decline in voter turnout.  Second, rising 
employment levels may actually serve to disengage citizens from the process of 
voting. Neither of these possible outcomes seem favourable from a democratic 
perspective.   I will now briefly address what I believe to be possible and 
appropriate remedies by way of conclusion. 
Income inequality is, in effect, a person's financial standing in society, and 
hinders democracy by blocking full participation in that society and limiting a 
sense of belonging.
285
  The more obvious that this is, the more that an individual 
may feel that they do not have enough income compared to others. This feeling 
apparently leads all too often to anger, and a sense that the government is a hostile 
and alien system. Anger, in this context, may be a political motivator. However, 
the outcome is likely to be the opposite. Individuals who have withdrawn from 
voting, who blame themselves, and not the government, for their circumstances, 
and are paired with others who do not believe that their vote will make a 
difference, become joint participants in a large-scale decline in voter turnout. 
Although it is more likely that many of them simply cannot support themselves 
because the system is failing economically, and because redistributive polices are 
ineffective, the subjective impressions become ‗reality‘, voter turnout continues to 
decline, right-of-centre parties continue to prosper, and inequality grows. The 
trend toward greater income equality must, in this view, be recaptured, either by 
redistributive policies (progressive taxation), or by ‗growing the pie‘ with 
redistributive salary schedules. Admittedly, these strategies are far from reality in 
the current global and national settings. 
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Addressing the problems of lower voter turnout and inequality through 
employment is particularly tricky.  New Zealand‘s employment law already offers 
two hours of paid leave for voting.
286
 Voting could be made easier by online 
voting, which could be made available in the work place; voting hours would not 
be as limited for many people. Increased education is probably needed as well, 
such that citizens are given greater awareness of the importance of voting. 
Workplaces might be incentivized to encourage voting, although, again, this could 
easily be abused.   
Limitations and Areas for Further Research  
 
This study employed both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Limitations 
included its scale: only four nation elections and 13 electoral voting districts (out 
of a possibility of six-four) were examined. The statistics in this study were 
reproduced from Statistics New Zealand
287
 with time period changes in the 
Census.  Employment data also imposed limitations: employment is measured 
from the age of 15 years old in New Zealand, while voting is recorded from 18 
years of age.       
Additional variables, such as education levels, and personal income levels, 
would have been helpful, and will be considered in future research.  Face-to-face 
interviews would also greatly enhance a study of this sort, and will be considered 
in future research. Finally, it is clear that income inequality is physically and 
emotionally ‗unhealthy‘ for a for society. Given that income inequality has been 
increasing at levels higher than the international average, this question requires 
much greater examination in the context of New Zealand. Voter turnout, although 
greater than the international average, has been slowly declining in New Zealand. 
Participation in politics is arguably driven by income. Income differences are 
hindering full participation by limiting it to the economic elite, the wealthy. 
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Goodin and Dryzek argue that the more that economic power is concentrated 
within that elite, the more the bottom income earners will withdraw from electoral 
voting.
288
 Inequality, then, ultimately means unhealthy and unequal politics, and 
in this sense our national politics are increasingly challenging the fundamental 
principles of democracy: equality and freedom.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Household Income Inequality and Voter Turnout  
 
Christchurch East  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Christchurch East Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New 
Zealand Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 
February 2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Hamilton East  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Hamilton East Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Invercargill  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Invercargill Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Mt Albert  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Mt Albert Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Napier 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Napier Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Nelson 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Nelson Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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New Plymouth  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, New Plymouth Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Northland  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Northland Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Palmerston North 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Palmerston North Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New 
Zealand Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 
February 2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Taupō 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Taupō Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Wellington Central  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Wellington Central Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New 
Zealand Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 
February 2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Ikaroa-Rāwhiti 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Ikaroa-Rāwhiti Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Waiariki 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Waiariki Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Appendix 2: Party votes and Household Income Inequality  
 
Christchurch East  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Christchurch East Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New 
Zealand Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 
February 2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Hamilton East  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Hamilton East Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Invercargill  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Invercargill  Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Mt Albert  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Mt Albert Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Napier 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Napier  Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Nelson 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Nelson  Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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New Plymouth  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, New Plymouth Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Northland 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Northland Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Palmerston North  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Palmerston North  Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New 
Zealand Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 
February 2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Taupō 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Taupō  Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Wellington Central  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Wellington Central Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New 
Zealand Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 
February 2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Ikaroa-Rāwhiti 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Ikaroa-Rāwhiti Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Waiariki  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Waiariki Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Appendix 3: Household Income Inequality and Unemployment rate  
 
Christchurch East  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Christchurch East Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New 
Zealand Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 
February 2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Hamilton East  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Hamilton East Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Invercargill  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Invercargill Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Mt Albert  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Mt Albert  Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Napier  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Napier Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Nelson 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Nelson  Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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New Plymouth  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, New Plymouth  Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Northland  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Northland Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
73.00%
74.00%
75.00%
76.00%
77.00%
78.00%
79.00%
80.00%
81.00%
82.00%
2005 2008 2011 2014
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
u
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
 
 
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 in
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 
in
co
m
e 
in
eq
u
al
it
y 
 
 
Year of election voting  
New Plymouth  
Voter turnout Unemployment rate
Linear (Voter turnout ) Linear (Unemployment rate )
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
70.00%
72.00%
74.00%
76.00%
78.00%
80.00%
82.00%
2005 2008 2011 2014
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
u
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
 
 
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 in
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 
in
co
m
e 
in
eq
u
al
it
y 
 
 
Year of election voting  
Northland 
Voter turnout Unemployment rate
Linear (Voter turnout ) Linear (Unemployment rate )
  
123 
Palmerston North  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Palmerston North  Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New 
Zealand Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 
February 2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Taupō  Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Wellington Central  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Wellington Central Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New 
Zealand Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 
February 2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
 
Ikaroa-Rāwhiti 
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Ikaroa-Rāwhiti Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Waiariki  
 
Source: Parliamentary Library,  New Zealand Parliament, Waiariki Electorate Profile, (New Zealand, New Zealand 
Government, 2005 to 2014) < https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/> [accessed 5 February 
2017]. Reprinted with permission of the authors.  See: Appendix #5. 
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Appendix 5: Permission for use of data from electoral profiles – 
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Appendix 6: Permission to use graphs in, Bryan Perry, Household incomes in 
New Zealand: Trends in indictors of inequality and hardship 1982-2014  
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